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THE HOLDING COMPANY AS A COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATION
UNDER SECTION 341 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
Louis A. DEL COTTO*
INTRODUCTION
W HEN Congress attacked the collapsible corporation problem by enacting
the predecessor of section 341, it defined a collapsible corporation as one
formed or availed of principally for the manufacture, construction, or production
of property with a view to the sale or exchange of stock by shareholders or a
distribution of property to them prior to the,realization by the corporation of
a substantial part of the income to be derived from such property. Recognizing
that this definition could easily be avoided by the interposition of a holding
company between the operating company' and the shareholders, the definition
also included, in addition to the operating company, a corporation formed or
availed of "principally for the holding of stock in a corporation so formed or
availed of.' 2 The purpose of this provision was to prevent the use of corporations
as "holding companies having no other business than to separate the shareholders
from the corporation undertaking the project."3 Thus, section 341 seems to
promise that its provisions will provide identical results whether applied to a
corporation which is an operating company or to a corporation the principal
activity of which is to hold the stock of an operating company. The purpose of
this article is to investigate the extent to which this promise of section 341(b)
has been fulfilled or is capable of fulfillment.
BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEm
The collapsible corporation device was conceived in the motion picture and
building construction industries. The device called for the formation of a corpo-
ration for the purpose of producing a motion picture or constructing a housing
tract. Upon completion of the film or the tract, but before the corporation
realized any income from the assets, the corporation was liquidated, the share-
holders receiving in exchange for their stock undivided interests in the assets
produced or constructed. The shareholders paid a capital gains tax on the differ-
ence between the basis in their stock and the fair market value of the property
interest received.4 The basis in the property interest was its fair market valuer
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
1. The term "operating company" will be used to describe the corporation which manu-
factures, constructs, produces or purchases property within the meaning of section 341(b) (1).
2. Rev. Act of 1950, § 212(a); Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(m).
3. H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reproduced in 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 449.
4. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 331(a).
5. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 334(a).
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and upon collection by the shareholder of the rentals from the film, or from the
sale of the constructed property, there was no further income to the shareholder
until basis had been recovered. Thus, the corporation was "collapsed" before it
realized any ordinary income and the corporate tax was completely avoided.
Also, there was avoided the payment by the shareholders of any ordinary in-
come tax on dividends which would have been distributed from corporate earn-
ings had the corporation not been liquidated.
Failing to obtain relief in the courts,6 in 1950 the Treasury obtained from
Congress corrective legislation, the predecessor of section 341. 7 As the Commit-
tee Reports recognized, the collapsible device had been used chiefly in the
motion picture and building industries. Two different kinds of problems were
presented: first, avoidance of tax at the corporate level by collapse of the cor-
poration prior to the time it realized -any substantial ordinary income, and
second, the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain when a dealer in
property incorporated single units into separate corporations and sold his stock
or liquidated the corporation when the unit was completed, thereby obtaining
the appreciation in the unit or a stepped-up basis in the property, at capital
gains rates.8 The statutory solution to both problems, the avoidance of ordinary
income at the corporate level and the conversion of ordinary income into capital
gain at the shareholder level, was to tax as ordinary income any gain to share-
holders from sales of stock or distributions of property. 9 Thus, the real estate
dealer and builder who sold the stock of, or liquidated, the construction company
was treated as if he had sold the asset. His gain received ordinary income
treatment. A liquidation of the motion picture producing company by its
shareholders gave the same result although here the main problem had been
the avoidance of ordinary income at the corporate level. To this extent, the
statute was somewhat misdirected. The misdirection was enhanced by penalizing
all gain realized by the shareholder before the corporation had realized a
substantial part of the taxable income to be derived from the property. Although
the statute was aimed only at the "temporary" corporation, it provided no
escape in the situation where the corporation did have such substantial realiza-
tion after the realization of the gain by the shareholder on the sale of stock.
Thus, the fact that a corporation is not "temporary," and continues in exist-
ence after a sale of its stock, does not preclude it from being a collapsible
corporation. 10 Also, and even though the committee reports clearly recognize
that the collapsible device had been used- primarily in the motion picture and
construction industries, the statute made collapsible any corporation which was
6. See Herbert v. Riddell, 103 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Cal. 1952); Pat O'Brien, 25 T.C.
376 (1955); acq., 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 4; Frank E. Gilman, 14 T.C. 833 (.1950).
7. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(m).
8. H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reproduced in 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 423.
9. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 341(a).
10. Raymond G. Burge, 28 T.C. 246 (1957), aff'd sub nom. Burge v. Commissioner,
253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958).
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formed or availed of for the prohibited purpose, or for the holding of stock in
such a corporation. Applied literally, this language could make collapsible cor-
porations of most of the major industrial corporations in this country," and
it is only the Regulations which prevent such a construction of the statute.12
In 1951, the coverage of the statute was extended to include corporations
formed or availed of for the purchase of property which is inventory or stock
in trade in the hands of the corporation. 3 This prevented the transformation of
ordinary income into capital gain by way of a transfer of appreciated inventory
to the corporation and a sale of the stock.14 In 1954, there came into the statute
the concept of "section 341 assets,"'15 which includes all categories of purchased
property constituting collapsible assets. In this category is stock in trade and
property held primarily for sale to customers, the only purchased property that
section 117(m) of the 1939 Code treated as collapsible property. Added to this
category in 1954 were unrealized receivables or fees and property described in
section 1231(b) (without regard to the holding period). Inclusion of section
1231(b) property as a collapsible asset was apparently intended to prevent
dealers in real estate from converting ordinary income into capital gain through
the use of the corporation to purchase such property (note that corporations
producing or constructing any property were already in the collapsible category),
and then selling his stock or liquidating at capital gains rates. However, the
statute in no way limited its application to dealers in real estate. Hence, a literal
application of its provisions could convert capital gain into ordinary income where
investors in rental real estate chose the corporate form to hold the real estate
and then sold their stock or liquidated.' 6 Also added in 1954 was the presump-
tion of collapsibility contained in section 341(c).
Not wishing to penalize all shareholders who were caught within the terms
of section 341(a), (b) and (c), Congress has enacted specific exceptions to the
application of the provisions of section 341(a). The only exception which was
present in the original enactment is section 341 (d). 17 Subsection (e) was
enacted in 1958 and subsection (f) in 1964 to further limit the impact of section
341(a). These relief provisions, as they relate to holding companies, will be
discussed in detail in a later context.
11. See Axelrad, Collapsible Corporations and Collapsible Partnerships, U. So. Cal.
12th Tax Inst. 269, 293-97 (1960). Hall, The Consenting Collapsible Corporation-Section
341(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 12 U.C.L.A.,. Rev. 1365, n.4 (1965).
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-5(c) (1) (1955).
13. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 341(b) (3).
14. Conf. Comm. Rep. 1951-2 Cum. Bull. 313; H.R. Rep. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. reproduced in 1951-2 Cum. Bull. 375. See Jacobs v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 412 (9th
Cir. 1955).
15. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 341(b) (3).
16. Axelrad, supra note 11, at 301, 302; Bittker, Federal Income Taxation of Corpo-
rations and Shareholders 309 (1959).
17. The 1954 Code reduced the percentage of safe stock ownership under section
341(d) (1) from ten percent to five percent.
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SECTION 341(b): THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE BEHIND THE
HOLDING COMPANY PROVISION
Section 341 (a) taxes as ordinary income what would otherwise be long term
capital gain from the sale of stock of, or a distribution of property in liquidation
or otherwise from, a "collapsible corporation." If section 341 (b) were to include
in the category of collapsible corporations only operating companies, that is,
those corporations which manufacture, produce, construct or purchase collaps-
ible property, the section could be easily avoided by the interposition of a hold-
ing company between the operating company and the shareholders. A liquidation
of the holding company, or a sale of its stock, would not, under the literal terms
of such a statute, give rise to gain from the sale of stock or the liquidation of a
collapsible corporation. The holding company could liquidate and distribute the
operating company stock to the individual shareholder at the cost of a single
capital gains tax to the shareholder.'8 Then the operating company could be
liquidated at no further tax cost to the shareholder since in the usual case the
value of its assets would not exceed the newly acquired basis of the shareholder
in its stock.19 Or, upon a sale by the shareholder of the stock in the holding
company at capital gains rates, the buyer would have a basis in the stock equal
to the value of the operating company stock, and this basis would also be equal
to the value of its assets. The buyer could then engage in consecutive liquida-
tions at no further tax cost to anyone, and wind up with the operating assets in
his hands with a basis to him equal.to the value of the assets. To prevent such
avoidance of the section, included in the definition of a collapsible corporation
by section 341(b) is a corporation formed or availed of principally "for the
holding of stock in a corporation so formed or availed of." Hence, any liquidation
of the collapsible holding company, or sale of its stock, will bring the shareholder
ordinary income under section 341 (a).
When Is a Holding Company Collapsible?
A literal reading of the statute and the Regulations leads to the result that
a holding company is never collapsible upon the sale of its stock or its liquida-
tion. This follows from the definition in section 341(b) which includes as a
collapsible corporation one formed or availed of "for the holding of stock in
a corporation so formed or availed of, with a view to" sale of the corporate
stock or a distribution to shareholders prior to substantial realization of income
by the corporation. 0 Under the literal terms of this definition, on a sale of
stock or liquidation of the holding company of a collapsible corporation, the
holding company would not be a collapsible corporation since there would be
no sale of the stock of, or liquidation of, the operating company. Hence, the
operating company would not be formed or availed of with a view to its col-
18. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 331(a) (1), 336.
19. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 334(a).
20. See Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a)(1), (2) (1955).
527
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lapse, and the holding company parent could not be collapsible.21 Obviously,
such an interpretation of the statute would render the holding company provi-
sion meaningless. Holding companies could never be collapsible despite the
fact that the statute clearly attempts to reach them, and despite the fact that
the Congress intended them to be caught.2 2 Therefore, the statute can be rea-
sonably interpreted only to require that the "view to" be to the sale or ex-
change of stock in the holding company prior to substantial realization by the
subsidiary operating company, rather than to sale or exchange of stock in the
operating company prior to substantial realization by it.
23
Another problem arising from inept draftsmanship is that the statute seems
to require only a "view" to collapse before the corporation derives substantial
income from its property. Applied literally, the statute would require that gain
from the sale of stock or a distribution be taxed as ordinary income if the requi-
site "view" were present, even though the sale or liquidation took place after
the corporation had realized all its income. However, the Regulations prevent
'the statute from operating when the corporation has realized a substantial part
of the taxable income at the time of the sale or distribution,2 4 and the Com-
mittee Reports support this view.
2 5
What Is a "Holding Company"?
The Committee Report states the holding company language in section
341(b) was intended to apply to "holding companies having no other business
than to separate the shareholders from the corporation undertaking the proj-
ect."2 6 The statute prevents the obvious avoidance possibilities in such a narrow
application to holding companies by including as collapsible corporations those
corporations formed or availed of "principally . . . for the holding of stock"27
in an operating collapsible corporation. The broader reach of the statute pre-
sumably would catch corporations whose holding activity is greater than all
its other activities.28 The Regulations give no aid whatsoever on this problem.
Indeed, except where the statutory definition of a collapsible corporation is re-
21. See Axelrad, supra note 11, at 313.
22. H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reproduced in 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 449.
23. See Axelrad, supra note 11, at 313.
24. Treas. Reg. 1.341-2(a)(4) (1955). See DeWind & Anthoine, Collapsible Corpo-
rations, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 475, 484 (1956); Bittker, op. cit. supra note 16, at 306. But see
Payne v. Commissioner, 268 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959), and compare with Commissioner
v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904, at 911, n.17 (5th Cir. 1961).
25. H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reproduced in 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 449,
450; S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reproduced at 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 516.
26. H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reproduced in 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 449.
(Emphasis added.)
27. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 341(b) (1). (Emphasis added.)
28. How the "activity" of holding stock is to be measured against such activities as
manufacturing, operating rental real estate, etc., seems an almost impossible problem.
However, to view such holding as merely inactivity would so obviously defeat the purpose
of the statute that dearly some test must be devised to measure whether "holding" is a
principal activity. Perhaps this could be done in terms of asset values, using the ratio of
stock values to all asset values.
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stated,29 nowhere in the Regulations is the word "principally" even mentioned,
much less defined. Instead, the word "substantial" is substituted.30 As to holding
companies, the Regulations provide:
a corporation shall be considered a collapsible corporation by reason of
holding stock in other corporations which manufactured, constructed,
produced, or purchased the property only if the activity of the corpora-
tion in holding stock in such other corporation is substantial in relation
to the other activities of the corporation.31
Thus, the Regulations transform the fairly precise requirement of the statute-
that the holding of stock must be a principal activity of the corporation-into
a more imprecise, and probably broader, test that such holding must be merely
"substantial activity."
No doubt the test of the Regulations is better suited than that of the statute
to prevent tax avoidance through the use of holding companies to screen collaps-
ible corporations from the application of section 341. A better considered legis-
lative judgment would be preferable, but if the test of the Regulations is upheld
by the courts, and there is persuasive authority in its favor,3 2 a proper legislative
solution to the problem is less likely. As a result, this area of the law will be-
come mired in the Serbonian Bog which presently engulfs the meaning of "sub-
stantial part" in section 341 (b). As already noted, section 341(b) requires that
the corporation be formed or availed of principally for manufacture or purchase
of property with a view to selling stock or collapsing the corporation by way of
a distribution to shareholders before a "substantial part of the taxable income
to be derived" from the property has been realized. Hence, whether or not sec-
tion 341 will apply depends on how much is substantial and how it is measured.
At present, the question of how much is substantial is in complete confusion in
the courts.3 3 For several years the Internal Revenue Service in private letter
rulings took the position that 50 percent or more was substantial and that the
percentage was to be determined by comparing the income from the collapsible
property already taxed with the unrealized appreciation of the property. How-
ever, since the 50 percent rule is apparently the subject of disagreement within
the Service,34 no ruling has ever beenpublished. In the meantime, the Courts
have dealt with the problem in various ways. In Kelley v. Commissioner35 and
Commissioner v. Zongker,36 it was held that a realization of one-third of the
net income was substantial. In Levenson v. United States37 51 percent was held
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (1955).
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-5(b) (1955).
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-5(b) (1955).
32. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (11947). Cf. Malot
v. Riddell, -U.S.-, 86 S. Ct. 1030 (1966).
33. See generally Axelrad, supra note 11, at 316-23.
34. Axelrad, supra note 11, at 318.
35. 32 T.C. 135 (1959), aff'd sub nom. Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904 (5th
Cir. 1961).
36. 334 F.2d 44 (loth Cir. 1964).
37. 157 F. Supp. 244 (N). Ala. 1957).
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substantial, and in Heft v. Commissioner,38 17 percent was held insubstantial.
However, in Abbott v. Commissioner,39 where 10.84 percent of the income had
been realized, the court held it was not necessary to determine whether this was
a substantial part because the real question posed by the statute was not whether
a substantial part had been realized prior to the dissolution, but rather whether
that part of the total income remaining to be realized was substantial. Although
at first blush this seems to be an outrageous reading of the statute, it is literally
a correct possibility. Merely because a substantial part has been realized does
not preclude there being a substantial part unrealized. Thus, if 50 percent of
the net income is realized prior to a sale of stock or distribution collapsing the
corporation, and if this is held to be substantial, under a literal application of
the statute the sale or collapse has taken place both after and before the realiza-
tion of a substantial part of the income. The statute both applies to the trans-
action and does not apply. Faced with this choice, the Third Circuit in Abbott
chose the interpretation of the statute least favorable to the taxpayer. Not only
must a substantial amount of the income be realized at the critical time, there
must remain only an insubstantial part to be realized thereafter.
The rule of Abbott was rejected by the Fifth Circuit in Kelley4° where
one-third of the income had been realized. The Court held that the term "a sub-
stantial part" refers to the realized, not to the unrealized, portion of the income.
A dissent argued that the Abbott rule better carried out the legislative purpose,
which was to prevent transformation of ordinary income into capital gain. The
majority rule, noted the dissent, assumed Congress only intended to close a
loophole one-third of the way and to leave it two-thirds open. The majority
admitted this and pointedly stated:
But the best workman can work only with the tools he has. If Congress
wants a better job done, Congress should provide a tool that will not
just plug the loophole "a substantial part of the way." 4 '
The majority in Kelley seems to have the better of the argument. If Congress
had intended the Abbott rule, it could have easily required that "substantially
all" the income be realized prior to the sale of stock or the collapse. Instead it
chose to use the words "a substantial pqrt." Since, as Kelley correctly notes,42
there can be more than one substantial part to a whole, the reference of Con-
gress to a substantial part is a reference to the first substantial part. In other
words, a reading of the statute to say "any substantial part" is more consistent
with its grammatical construction than a reading of it to say "substantially all."
Mr. Justice Holmes succinctly stated the limits of judicial inquiry in
such a case: "We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask
only what the statute means.1 4
3
38. 294 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1961).
39. 258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958).
40. Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961).
41. Id. at 913.
42. Id. at 911, 912.
43. Id. at 912.
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Fortunately, and in spite of Holmes's dictum to the contrary, the Kelley court
did enquire into legislative intent and found that Congress most probably in-
tended a narrow exception to the broad general rule of capital gains taxation.
Therefore, both the words of the statute and the legislative history supported
the majority opinion.44 However, the Service will not follow Kelley and has
adopted the rationale of Abbott.
45
How then will this body of opinion on the meaning of "substantial" affect
the definition regarding the collapsibility of a holding company? If the rule of
Kelley ultimately prevails, the Treasury will be in a dilemma. An argument for
the greatest possible percentage to be assigned to the term "substantial" on the
question of how much income must be realized is an argument against a smaller
percentage of holding activity on the question of whether a corporation's holding
activities are substantial in relation to its other activities. The higher the per-
,centage of income the courts are persuaded to require on the first point, the
more holding activity will escape the "substantial activity" requirement of the
Regulation. Since, at least at present, the first issue is the more important of
the two, presumably the holding company will be the beneficiary of a Treasury
victory in the other area. On the other hand, it is possible for the Treasury to
have its cake and eat it too. If the Abbott rule eventually prevails, and that is
the rule the Service is contending for, on both points the Treasury can argue
for the smallest possible percentage to be assigned to the term substantial. The
smaller the amount of realized income that is substantial the greater the amount
of income that remains unrealized and the more corporations that fall within
the Abbott rule; and, of course, "substantial activity" is then construed with
the same low numerical content, which will maximize the number of holding
companies brought within it. For example, suppose the Commissioner could
establish that five percent is a substantial part of the income to be derived from
property. Since a substantial part also remains unrealized, the Abbott rule would
prevent escape from collapsibility on this ground. In the case of a holding com-
pany that -held five percent in value of the outstanding stock of a corporation
formed for the production of property with the requisite view, or if that stock
comprised five percent of the value of corporate assets, does not the Commis-
sioner have an argument that the stock holding activity is substantial?
As far-fetched as this hypothetical may seem, there is some support for it
in section 341(f), enacted by Congress in 1964 to provide further relief from
the collapsible corporation provisions.4" Section 341 (f) exempts sales of stock
from the provisions of section 341(a) if the corporation consents to recognize
gain, measured by the unrealized appreciation, when it disposes of any "sub-
section (f) asset," generally defined as any non-capital asset, but including all
real property. Under this provision, the shareholder is normally assured of
44. Id. at 912-13.
45. Rev. Rul. 62-12, 1962-1 Cum. Bull. 321.
46. See generally Hall, supra note 11, at 1365; Sinrich, New Collapsible Relief Measure
Is More Useful Than Most Tax Men Believe, 23 J. Taxation 148 (1965).
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capital gain on the sale of his stock if the corporation properly consents, even
if the corporation is collapsible under section 341(b). The price of capital gain
at the shareholder level is recognition of gain at the corporate level on the dis-
position of corporate subsection (f) assets. The corporate gain is treated as if
received on a sale or exchange of the asset.
If section 341 (f) made no provision for holding companies, in certain cases
it could render ineffective the whole of section 341. For example, on the sale
of the stock of a corporation which held only the stock of a collapsible operating
company, the consent to subsection (f) treatment by the holding company
would be an empty formality since its only assets, the shares of stock, are not
subsection (f) assets. The purchaser of the holding company stock could then
engage in consecutive liquidations, first of the holding company which would
incur no subsection (f) tax for lack of tainted assets, and then of the operating
company which would never have consented to a subsection (f) tax. Thus, the
corporations could be collapsed to put the physical assets into the hands of
the stock purchaser at a stepped-up basis at the cost of only a single capital
gains tax to the seller.
In order to prevent such escape from section 341 (a) by use of section 341 (f)
while at the same time avoiding the subsection (f) penalty by the use of a
holding company, section 341 (f) (6) provides that if the corporation whose
stock is sold owns five percent or more in value of the outstanding stock of
another corporation on the date of the sale of the stock, the consent of the
"owning corporation" to section 341(f) treatment is not valid with respect to
the stock sale unless the subsidiary has also filed a valid consent with respect
to sales of its stock. Section 341 (f) (6) goes on to treat a sale of holding com-
pany stock as a sale of the stock of the subsidiary. The net effect of the holding
company provisions is to make subsection (f) assets the non-capital assets and
real property owned by the subsidiary on the date of the sale of the stock of
the holding company. Thus, a distribution by the subsidiary in a taxable liqui-
dation, as in the above example, would require recognition of the subsection (f)
penalty.
47
What then is the effect of section 341 (f) (6) upon the definition of a col-
lapsible corporation? As we have seen, section 341 (b) defines such a corporation
as one formed or availed of principally for the holding of stock in a collapsible
operating company. The Regulation transforms "principally" into "substantial
activity." Does Section 341(f) (6), which ties together corporations connected
by five percent stock ownership, give content to these words? Certainly the
holding of five percent of the stock of another corporation may be a corpora-
tion's principal or even sole activity. On the other hand, it may be an absolutely
negligible activity of a corporation which is engaged mostly in its own active
operations. The five percent ownership test seems to have no necessary connec-
47. Subsection (f) is later discussed more thoroughly with regard -to the holding com-
pany provisions. See text accompanying notes 119-28, injra.
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tion to the definition of a collapsible holding company since it is solely in terms
of stock ownership, without regard to the amount of activity which that stock
ownership represents. Does this test then serve some purpose of subsection (f)
which is not present under subsection (b)? Apparently not. The purposes of
subsection (f) and subsection (b) appear to be the same: to prevent the use
of holding companies in avoidance of the provisions of section 341 (a). For ex-
ample, suppose each of 20 individuals own five percent of the stock of an
operating collapsible corporation. If each of them were to place his stock in a
separate corporation, a sale of the stock of any holding company would be
within the contemplation of section 341(b) in the absence of a consent under
subsection (f), and would be within the contemplation of subsection (f) if
such consent were filed. This is so because the holding company is so clearly a
vehicle for avoidance of section 341(a). By treating it as collapsible, it cannot
be used to avoid section 341 (a) through a sale of its stock or a liquidation of
it at capital gain rates, with a liquidation in turn of the operating company at
no further tax cost. And if a subsection (f) consent had been filed, upon con-
secutive liquidations of the holding company and the subsidiary by the pur-
chaser of the stock, the subsidiary would incur the subsection (f) tax. However,
if the ownership of the stock is only a negligible activity of the holding com-
pany, then its liquidation is an extremely unlikely vehicle for placing the assets
of the subsidiary into the hands of the purchaser of the holding company stock
at only the cost of a capital gain to the seller. The real purpose of such a holding
company is to operate its own business and not to be used as part of a scheme
whereby both it and the operating company will be collapsed in avoidance of
section 341(a). It does not serve the purpose of section 341 (a) to include such
a corporation in the definition of a collapsible holding company. Nor does it
serve the purpose of section 341(f) which, like subsection (b), is intended to
prevent the collapse of the corporations and the placing of the operating assets
in the hands of stock purchasers at only a single capital gains tax to the seller.
Since a corporation which owns five percent of the stock of a collapsible
operating company as a negligible part of its overall activities is so clearly not
within the contemplation of any part of section 341 merely by reason of such
stock ownership, what is the reason for the five percent stock ownership test of
subsection (f) (6) ? The Treasury may well argue that since the purposes of sub-
section (b) and subsection (f) are the same, subsection (f) (6) has reduced the
word "principally" and the test of "substantial activity" to the five percent
ownership test. Otherwise, the argument goes, there would simply be no reason
for Congress to enact the test of (f) (6) without regard to the other activities of
the corporation. Hopefully, the courts will recognize that (f) (6) is just another
instance of inept draftsmanship which is so prevalent throughout section 341,
especially with respect to holding companies. Most likely the problem arises
because of the failure of Congress to see the basic inconsistency of the two pro-
visions. Apparently the five percent provision of (f) (6) was patterned after
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section 341 (d) (1) which allows gain to a shareholder of a collapsible corpora-
tion to escape section 341 (a) where he owns less than five percent in value of
the stock.48 Under (d) (1), more than five percent ownership is considered "sub-
stantial" enough for the shareholder to be prevented from avoiding the collap-
sible provisions. The same reasoning apparently led to the similar "5 percent or
more" test of (f) (6) without regard to the fact that a holding company is not
initially collapsible except where such stock holding is a principal activity or is
substantial in relation to the other activities of the corporation. Hence, there
should be no need for such a holding company to consent under subsection (f)
where it is not initially collapsible. Even where there is no intent to collapse it
may be unwise to so consent since the provisions of subsection (f) which require
recognition of gain extend to more situations than distributions of property to
shareholders and may impede the legitimate operations of both corporations. 49
The Problem of a Chain of Holding Companies
Because section 341(b) expressly deals with only one holding company, it
may be possible to avoid the statute by the use of a series of holding com-
panies. Thus, the individual shareholders may interpose two or more corpora-
tions between themselves and the operating company. The holding company
owned directly by the individuals will not be a collapsible corporation since it
will not have been formed or availed of for the holding of stock in a corporation
formed or availed of for the manufacture, construction or purchase of property.
Thus, a sale of its stock, or its liquidation, will not be within the provisions of
section 341(a) and will give rise to capital gain to the shareholders. The other
corporations can then be liquidated in turn without further gain to be caught
by section 341 (a), and there will have been a collapse of the corporations with-
out incurring ordinary income tax under section 341 (a). Because the Congres-
sional purpose is so clearly against such literal construction of the statute,
some commentators feel that the courts may disregard any holding company
intervening between the operating company and the holding company directly
owned by the individuals 0 And certainly the Commissioner will argue that the
statute contains an unintended gap which should be filled by applying the legis-
lative purpose. Indeed, in the holding company situation, the Treasury has
itself used the legislative intent to relieve a taxpayer from the operation of
section 341 (a) where its application would have imposed an unintended hard-
ship.51 By a parity of reasoning, where a gap in the statute provides an unin-
48. See also §§ 341(e) (1) (B), 341(e) (5) (A) (iv), and 341(e)(5)(B) for other varia-
tions on the five percent theme.
49. See text accompanying notes 119-28, infra.
50. DeWind & Anthoine, supra note 11, at 488; Axelrad, supra note 11, at 313, 314;
Maclean, Collapsible Corporations-The Statute and Regulations, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 55,
77 (1953).
51. In Rev. Rul. 56-50, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 174, it was held that the gain realized by
shareholders of a holding corporation upon liquidation of the holding corporation was not
taxable as ordinary income under section 341(a). The holding company has held stock in
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tended advantage to the taxpayer, legislative purpose should be used to fill
the gap and remove the advantage.
Nevertheless, there is authority in analogous situations which will prove
troublesome to the Commissioner in avoiding a literal interpretation of the
statute. 2 In Mead Corp. v. Commissioner53 it was held that section 104 of
the 1928 Revenue Act, which penalized the accumulation of a corporation's
earnings for the purpose of avoiding surtax upon "its" shareholders, did not
apply to accumulations of a subsidiary where the accumulations were for the
purpose of avoiding surtax only upon the shareholders of the parent, and not
upon the parent itself.54 Admitting that the legislative history indicated a result
contrary to the taxpayer, nevertheless, the court refused to go beyond the clear
words of the statute which, under the facts in the case, penalized only a sub-
sidiary formed or availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of
surtax upon its shareholders. Since the shareholder of the subsidiary was a
corporation, holding only the stock of the subsidiary, and such a parent corpora-
tion was then not subject to surtax, the subsidiary had not been formed or
availed of for the prohibited purpose. The court recognized that Congress had
five subsidiaries, and this stock composed virtually its entire assets. The stock had been
sold by the holding company pursuant to a court order resolving a dispute among the
shareholders. The ruling held that the parent was not collapsible on the liquidation, assum-
ing it had realized ordinary income on the sale of the stock of the five subsidiaries. The
ruling pointed out that the parent was a collapsible corporation under a literal reading of
section 3+1(b). Section 341(b) refers only to a realization of income by the corporation
producing the property, in this case the subsidiaries. Since the parent had realized the income
and not the subsidiaries, the parent was collapsible under the plain language of section 341(b).
Recognizing this, the ruling nevertheless held:
However, to impose the tax treatment provided for in section 341(a) of the
Code twice as to the same underlying collapsible property would extend the statute
beyond its intended purpose. The legislative history . . . makes it clear that the
objective was to prevent the successful use of a device for converting ordinary
income into long-term capital gain through the medium of a corporation ...
Where ordinary income is realized at the corporate level by the sale of the stock
of a collapsible subsidiary, the evil at which the statute was aimed is not present
and the effect of the literal interpretation suggested earlier would be to impose
what would amount to a penalty tax at the shareholder level through requiring
the gain attributable to property produced by a collapsible subsidiary to be taxed
at both levels as ordinary income. There is no evidence in the legislative history
that Congress intended such a result.
Rev. Rul. 56-50, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 174, 175-76.
52. Mead Corp. v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1940); Commissioner v.
Trustees Common Stock John Wanamaker Philadelphia, 178 F.2d 10 (3d Cir. 1949);
Emma Cramer, 20 T.C. 679 (1953).
53. 116 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1940).
54. The statute involved was the predecessor of section 531 and 532 and contained
language similar to these sections, and similar to section 341(b), imposing the penalty on
the net income of "any corporation . . . formed or availed of for the purpose of preventing
the imposition of the surtax upon its shareholders through the medium of permitting its
gains and profits to accumulate instead of being divided and distributed." The section was
amended in 1934 to apply the penalty to corporations "formed or availed of for the pur-
pose of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon its shareholders or the shareholders of
any other corporation." Mead Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 52, at 189, 193. The
amendment prevented avoidance of the penalty tax on accumulations of subsidiaries which
were intended to avoid the surtax on the shareholders of the parent.
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left an unintended gap in the statute and noted that "To supply omissions
transcends the judicial function." 55
In a case involving a similar problem, Commissioner v. Trustees Common
Stock John Wanamaker Philadelphia,56 the Mead Corp. case was relied on to
hold that amounts received from the sale of stock in a corporation to its wholly
owned subsidiary were not taxable as dividends. The subsidiary had not re-
deemed "its" stock as required by the statute, but had purchased from the
shareholder of the parent the stock of the parent. The Court again refused to
disregard the entity of the parent in order to obtain a result more consonant
with legislative intent.
Where two or more holding companies are interposed between the individual
shareholder and the operating company, by parity of reasoning with the above
cases a court could easily conclude that the corporation owned by the individual
shareholder was not formed or availed of to hold stock in an operating company
and thus is not collapsible under section 341(b). Such construction would be
aided by the fact that Congress did not provide for the application of rules of
attribution for determining ownership of stock under section 341 (b), although it
was careful to do so under section 341(d) for the determination of whether a
shareholder owned more than five percent of the corporation, and under 341(e)
for the purpose of determining the amount of stock ownership a shareholder has
in a corporation. Under both subsections (d) and (e), stock owned by a corpora-
tion is considered to be owned proportionately by its shareholders.57 If a similar
rule were to be applied under section 341(b), the holding company owned by
the individuals would be considered as owning the stock of the operating com-
pany because of its ownership of the stock of the second holding company, and
thus could be viewed as formed or availed or for the holding of stock in the
corporation formed or availed of for the manufacture or purchase of property.
However, no such attribution rule is called for.
Since the enactment of section 341(f) in 1964, the Commissioner seems
to have an argument that the holding company provisions of 341(f) (6) are
to be used in the construction of the holding company clause under 341(b).
Section 341 (f) (6) provides that where a consenting corporation owns five per-
cent or more in value of the outstanding stock of another corporation at the
time a qualifying sale is made, the consent of the "owning corporation" is valid
only if every other corporation in which the owning corporation has a five per-
cent or more interest files a consent to the recognition of gain on its subsection
(f) assets. To prevent avoidance of this provision by the use of a series of
holding companies whereby only the "owning corporation" and the corporation
whose stock it owns need consent to 341 (f) treatment, thereby avoiding the
application of 341 (f) to an operating company owned by the other corporation,
55. Mead Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 52,.at 191.
56. 178 F.2d 10 (3d Cir. 1949).
57. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 341(d) and (e) (10), which invoke the attribution
rules of § 544(a) (1).
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341 (f) (6) further provides that in the case of a chain of corporations connected
by five percent of stock ownership all corporations in the chain must file consents
to 341 (f) treatment and a sale of stock of the owning corporation is treated as a
sale of stock in the whole chain of corporations. Thus, there can be no collapse
of the chain of corporations without incurring the 341 (f) penalty on the oper-
ating company's subsection (f) assets.
Since in 341 (f) Congress provided a detailed solution to the problem of a
chain of collapsible corporations, the Commissioner may well prevail on an
argument that this solution be read into 341 (b). However, since the "consent"
filing approach of 341(f) has no specific application to the problem of 341(b),
all the Commissioner could urge would be a legislative intent demonstrated in
341(f) that a chain of holding companies not be allowed to defeat its provisions,
and hence not be allowed to defeat the application of 341(b). Indeed, unless
section 341 (b) is interpreted to include a chain of holding companies, the "chain
of corporations" language in section 341 (f) (6) will be rendered useless since no
consent will be filed by a corporation which is non-collapsible under section
341(b).
THE PRESUMPTION OF SECTION 341(c)
With the enactment of the 1954 Code, section 341(c) was introduced in
order to provide a presumption of collapsibility in certain cases. It provides that
a corporation shall, unless shown to the contrary, be presumed to be collapsible
if at the time of the sale or exchange of stock or the distribution described in
341 (a) "the fair market value of its section 341 assets (as defined in subsection
(b) (3)) is-(A) 50 percent or more of the fair market value of its total assets,
and (B) 120 percent or more of the adjusted basis of such section 341 assets."
In determining the value of total assets, no account is taken of cash, obligations
which are capital assets in the hands of the corporation, and stock in any other
corporation. Hence, the ratio of market value of section 341 assets to total assets
cannot be brought below 50 percent by contribution of other assets to the
corporation.
Under section 341 (c), if a corporation owns only an appreciated apartment
building held for less than 3 years, having a fair market value of 120,000 dollars
and in which the corporation has an adjusted basis of 100,000 dollars, the pre-
sumption of section 341(c) applies. The building is a section 341 asset and its
fair market value is 50 percent or more of the fair market value of its total
assets and 120 percent or more than its adjusted basis. The result is the same
if there is added to the total corporate assets cash and securities since these are
not taken into consideration in the determination of total assets.
But suppose that a holding company is interposed between the operating
company and the individual shareholders; on a sale of stock or a liquidation of
the holding company, does the presumption of section 341(c) apply? In the
case of a holding company that holds only stock, it seems clear that the pre-
sumption of collapsibility does not apply to the holding company since it has
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no section 341 assets as defined in subsection (b) (3).58 However, since the test
of 341(c) is applied as of the time "of the sale or exchange, or the distribution
described in subsection (a)," perhaps in the holding company situation, 341 (c)
intends the presumption of collapsibility to apply to the subsidiary at the time
of the sale of stock or collapse of the holding company. But then how is the pre-
sumptive collapsibility of the subsidiary to be attributed to the holding com-
pany? Apparently section 341(c) was drafted without regard to the inclusion
in section 341(b) of holding companies as collapsible corporations. A literal
application of its provisions would allow holding companies to escape the pre-
sumption of collapsibility unless legislative purpose is applied.
THE RELIEF PRovIsIoNs OF SECTION 341 (d)
Three avenues of escape from collapsible treatment are afforded by section
341(d).
1) Section 341 does not apply to the gain of a shareholder unless at any
time after commencement of manufacture, construction or production of collap-
sible property, or at the time of its purchase or thereafter the shareholder owned
more than five percent in value of the outstanding stock of the corporation, or
owned stock that is attributed to another shareholder who owned more than five
percent of such stock. Constructive ownership rules apply in determining owner-
ship of stock.
2) Section 341 does not apply to a shareholder's gain recognized during the
taxable year unless more than 70 percent of the gain is attributable "to the prop-
erty so manufactured, constructed, produced, or purchased."
3) Section 341 is inapplicable to a shareholder's gain realized more than
three years after the expiration of manufacture, construction, production or
purchase.
Section 341(d)(1): The Five Percent Shareholder
A shareholder who owns no more than five percent in value of the corporate
stock would be ill-advised to allow the interposition of a holding company be-
tween the corporation and himself. Without the holding company, under sub-
section (d) (1) he has a clear escape from the collapsible provisions. However,
if he incorporates the stock of the operating company into a holding company
of which he is more than five percent owner, a sale of the holding company stock,
or a liquidation of the holding company, will not fit within the literal terms of
subsection (d) (1). This is another situation where the statute is inadequate and
the intended relief can only be obtained through the vehicle of legislative history.
Section 341(d)(2): The 70-30 Ride
This is the so-called "70-30 rule" whereby the collapsible provisions can
be avoided if no more than 70 percent of a shareholder's gain on sale of his
58. Section 341(b)(3) includes as "Section 341 assets" stock in trade, inventory,
property held for sale to customers, unrealized receivables or fees, and section 1231(b)
property not used to manufacture or produce inventory type items.
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stock or upon a distribution is attributable to "the property so manufactured,
constructed, produced, or purchased." The "property" referred to in this para-
graplh seems to be the property described in section 341(b) (1): all qualifying
manufactured, constructed, and produced property together with qualifying
purchased section 341 assets.59 Hence, if 30 percent of the gain is attributable
to property not described in (b) (1), (d) (2) allows all the gain on a sale of
stock or a distribution to escape the collapsible provisions.
What is the property described in 341 (b) (1) the gain attributable to which
counts against the shareholder on the 70 percent side of the equation?
1) It seems clear that all manufactured, constructed or produced assets are
a "collapsible source" of gain unless the corporation has realized a substantial
part of the taxable income to be derived from the property.
2) Purchased section 341(b) (3) assets will be a collapsible source of gain
if there has been no substantial realization of the income therefrom. Such assets
are preferred over those that are manufactured, constructed or produced in two
respects. First, such assets which are held for three years or longer lose their
collapsible taint. Manufactured, constructed or produced property does not lose
its collapsible taint merely because construction was completed three years prior
to the sale of stock or collapse of the corporation."0 Second, only purchased
assets which are as described in section 341 (b) (3) are collapsible assets. Thus,
stock and securities held by a corporation for investment presumably are not
collapsible assets irrespective of how long they have been held. 61
As can be seen there are important differences in the application of the
70-30 rule where property is purchased rather than being manufactured, con-
structed, or produced. Necessary to the finding of when property is purchased
and not manufactured, constructed or produced, are the provisions of section
341(b) (2) which provide certain attribution rules whereby a corporation is
deemed to have manufactured, constructed or purchased property, if
1) the corporation engaged in the manufacture, construction, or produc-
tion of the property to any extent,
2) the corporation holds property having a basis determined in whole or in
part by reference to the cost of the property in the hands of a person
who manufactured, produced, constructed or purchased the property, or
3) the corporation holds property having a basis determined, in whole or in
59. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-4(c)(1) (1955). The use in section (d)(2) of the language
"property so manufactured," etc., is a reference back to (d)(1) which states: "at any time
after the commencement of the manufacture, construction, or production of the property, or
at the time of the purchase of the property described in subsection (b)(3)." This language
is a clear reference to all property described in (b) (1). See Goldstein, Section 341(d) and
(e)-A Journey Into Never-Never Land, 10 Vill. L. Rev. 215, 222 (1965).
60. See Goldstein, supra note 59, at 222, n.19. Although there may be escape under
section 341(d)(3), that possibility does not solve the problem raised under (d)(2).
61. See Chodorow & DeCastro, How to Use The "70-30" Exception to Avoid Collapsi-
ble Corporation Treatment, 21 J. Taxation 258, 260 (1964); DeWind & Anthoine, supra
note 24, at 503.
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part, by reference to cost of the property manufactured, constructed,
produced or purchased by the corporation.
Under the attribution rules, a corporation receiving property in a transfer
qualifying under section 351 would be considered to have acquired the property
in the same way as the transferor: by construction if constructed by the trans-
feror and by purchase if purchased by him.0 2 Similarly, if the corporation were
to exchange property constructed by it for property of a like kind constructed by
another person, and the exchange qualified under section 1031 (a), the corpora-
tion would be deemed to have constructed the property received in the ex-
change.
63
The problems raised under (d) (2) are numerous even where a holding
company is not in the picture. 64 The presence of a holding company raises a
further problem of whether the stock of the operating company owned by the
holding company is collapsible property described in section 341(b) (1). Since
stock in a collapsible corporation which is owned by a collapsible holding com-
pany is in fact mentioned in section 341(b) (1), it is possible to conclude that
such stock is a collapsible asset.65 However, a literal application of the statute
does not seem to bear out this analysis. Section 341(d) (2) does not refer to
all property described in section 341(b) (1), but instead refers to manufactured,
constructed, produced or purchased property described in section 341(b) (1).
Hence, to be a collapsible asset, the stock owned by the holding company must
be either manufactured, constructed, or produced, or it must be purchased prop-
erty which is described in section 341(b) (3) which lists certain assets held for
less than three years. 6e Because 'of the attribution provisions of section
341(b) (2), it is entirely possible for such stock to be either type of property.
It may be either produced or purchased, but if it is purchased it is not a col-
lapsible asset since shares of stock are not listed as section 341 assets in section
341(b) (3). Even where it is produced, and therefore is a collapsible asset,
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (5) (1955).
63. Ibid. Section 341(b) (2), if it were literally applied, would treat the property in
the above two examples as both constructed and purchased. Indeed, all manufactured
property would also be purchased, and purchased property would also be manufactured
when 'the subject of tax-free exchange. This, of course, would reduce to a shambles the
manufactured-purchased dichotomy of the statute, and apparently section 341(b) (2) is not
to be so construed. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (5), (6), (1955); DeWind & Anthoine, supra
note 24, at 493-94.
64. See generally, Axelrad, Collapsible Corporations and Collapsible Partnerships, U. So.
Cal. 12th Tax Inst. 269, 332-53 (1960); Moses, The 70 Per Cent Ride-A Possible Haven
for Taxpayers Faced with Collapsible Corporation Problems, 51 A.B.A.J. 188 (1965);
Chodorow & DeCastro, supra note 61, at 258; DeWind & Anthoine, supra note 24, at 514-17.
65. See Goldstein, supra note 59, at 222, 232; Axelrad, supra note 64, at 314-16.
66. In determining the three-year holding period under section 341(b)(3), the tacking
provisions of section 1223 are applied. Hence, a corporation that is collapsible within the
meaning of section 341(b) by reason of the purchase of section 341 assets will have the
benefit of the transferor's holding period where the basis of the corporation in the property
transferred is determined under section 362, and will have the benefit of its own holding
period in the property transferred where the basis in the property received by the corpo-
ration is determined under sections 1031(d) or 358. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1223(1), (2).
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bizarre results may obtain on a literal application of section 341(d) (2). Sup-
pose, for example, that an individual contributes an appreciated apartment
building to X Corporation in a transaction qualifying under section 351. In
the bands of X Corporation the apartment building will be constructed property
if it was constructed by the transferor, and it will be purchased property if it
was purchased by the transferor.6 7 Now suppose that X Corporation transfers
the apartment building to Y Corporation in exchange for all the Y stock in a
transaction qualifying under section 351. Y Corporation would seem to hold
the apartment building as constructed or purchased, whichever it was to X
Corporation. 8 Also, X Corporation would seem to hold Y stock as either con-
structed or purchased property, whichever the apartment building was in its
hands. 69
If the stock of Y Corporation is constructed property under the above rules,
a literal application of the 70-30 rule would not give relief from section 341 (a).
Since there will have been no substantial realization as to any of the shares of
stock, presumably any gain realized on the transaction is attributable 100 per-
cent to a collapsible asset, the Y stock, and the 70-30 rule does not apply. This
result is consistent with legislative purpose where the subsidiary owns only
appreciated collapsible assets as to which there has been no substantial realiza-
tion. However, where there has been substantial realization on the assets of the
subsidiary, or where the subsidiary has non-collapsible assets which represent 30
percent or more of its net worth, the result is inappropriate. In such a case, a
sale of the stock of the subsidiary would fall within the protection of the 70-30
rule since not more than 70 percent of the gain would be attributable to a col-
lapsible asset. To prevent the presence of a holding company from changing
this result the holding company would have to be disregarded and the gain on
the sale of its stock or its liquidation would be traced directly to the assets of
the subsidiary.
On the other hand, if the Y Corporation stock is purchased property in the
hands of X Corporation, since shares of stock are not section 341 assets, the
70-30 rule would always protect gain on the X Corporation stock. This is possi-
ble on a literal application of section 341(d) (2) even if gain on the disposition
of Y Corporation stock would not be protected by the 70-30 rule because more
than 70 percent of it would be attributable to collapsible assets of Y Corporation.
A further complication is introduced if the subsidiary is created under sec-
tion 351 by the individual shareholder incorporating the X Corporation stock
instead of X Corporation incorporating its assets. Now Y Corporation would
be the holding company and X Corporation the subsidiary. X Corporation will
still have acquired the apartment building in the same manner as the trans-
67. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 341(b) (2) (B), 362(a) (1).
68. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 341(b)(2)(B), 362(a)(1). The fact that X Corpora-
tion is only a "constructive" builder or purchaser does not seem to preclude the application
of these sections to this situation.
69. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 341(b) (2) (C), 358(a) (1).
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feror.70 If the transferor purchased the building, X Corporation holds it as pur-
chased property; if the transferor constructed the building, X Corporation
holds it as constructed property. However, the stock of X Corporation, which
is held by Y Corporation after a transfer by the individual shareholder, will in
all cases be a purchased asset in the hands of Y Corporation. This is so because
section 341(b) (2) does not trace the character of transferred property, here
the apartment building, into the shares of stock received by an individual, but
only into assets received by a corporation. Hence, on the incorporation of the
apartment building into X Corporation, the individual shareholder acquired the
X Corporation stock by actual purchase, unaffected by the provisions of section
341(b) (2), although he may have constructed the apartment building. There-
fore, Y Corporation holds the X Corporation stock as a purchaser under section
341(b) (2) (B), even though the apartment building is constructed property in
the hands of X Corporation. Thus, a holding company may be used so as to
change the nature of the property being sold from constructed property to the
more favored purchased property.
The above results are, of course, impossible to contemplate. To literally ap-
ply the statute in section 341(d) (2) situations involving holding companies
leads to results which are entirely inconsistent with the intent of Congress in
enacting the holding company provision of section 341(b) (1). This is another
example of a proper policy decision as regards holding companies, but a failure
on the part of Congress fully to analyze the problem. The only logical solution
is to apply not the statute, but the legislative intent, by looking through the
holding company to the assets of the subsidiary in applying the 70-30 rule3 1
The Service, however, has apparently suggested informally that the stock in the
collapsible corporation held by the holding company is "the property" within
the meaning of section 341(d) (2).72 Fortunately, this problem has probably
been solved by the enactment in 1958 of section 341 (e), discussed infra.73
70. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 341(b) (2) (B), 362(a) (1).
71. See Axelrad, supra note 64, at 314-16.
72. Axelrad, supra note 64, at 316.
73. An example is given by Axelrad, supra note 64, at 315-16:
Suppose Corporation A owns, as its only asset, all of the stock of Corporation B.
Corporation B has two groups of assets: non-collapsible assets, with an unrealized
appreciation of $100,000; and a manufactured collapsible asset with an unrealized
gain of $50,000.
On a sale of the stock of Corporation B, the 70 percent rule clearly
applies.
But on a sale of the stock of Corporation A, all of the gain is "attributable to"
the appreciation in the stock of Corporation B. If that stock is the "property"
referred to in (d) (2), 100 percent of the gain is "attributable" to it, and the
limitation is unavailable.
If, on the other hand, the "property" referred to is the manufactured collapsi-
ble asset, by looking through both corporations it appears that only one-third of
the gain is "attributable" to it, and the limitation applies.
This problem has probably been solved in large part, but perhaps inad-
vertently, by subsection (e). Stock of Corporation B would result in capital gain
to Corporation A if sold or exchanged by it for the reason that (d) (2) is applicable
in the example, supra, to take the sale out of 341(a). Accordingly, B's stock in
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Section 341(d) (3): The Three-Year Rule
Paragraph (3) of section 341(d) exempts from the operation of section 341
gain realized with respect to stock after the expiration of three years following
the completion of the manufacture, construction, production or purchase. In the
non-holding company situation, to which the statute was clearly intended to
apply, if the corporation constructs or purchases an apartment building, a sale
of the stock three years after the purchase or completion of construction is pro-
tected by (d) (3). But suppose the building is transferred to the corporation
under section 351 after completion or purchase by the individual shareholder.
Is the holding period of the individual shareholder after completion of construc-
tion or purchase to be "tacked" to that of the corporation for purposes of com-
puting the holding period under section 341(d) (3)? Unlike section 341(b) (3)
where "tacking" is permitted by specific reference to section 1233, section
341(d) (3) contains no such reference. However, since the nature of the prop-
erty, that is, whether it is produced or purchased, is traced by section
341 (b) (2), it seems a logical corollary that the holding period should be tacked.
Thus, in a transfer under section 351 to X Corporation of a constructed apart-
ment house, X Corporation will be deemed to hold constructed property under
(b) (2) (B) and its holding period for the property will begin on the date of
the purchase by the individual shareholder under section 1223(2). Sim'larly,
under section 1223(1) the shareholder will have a holding period for his stock
which includes the period for which he held the apartment house.74
If X Corporation were to incorporate the apartment building into a sub-
sidiary, Y Corporation, under section 351, like results should follow upon a sale
of the stock of X Corporation. Under sections 1223(1) and (2), both X and Y
Corporations will have the benefit of the period for which the individual share-
holder held the apartment building. Also, under section 341 (b) (2) (B) and (C),
both the apartment building and the stock of Y will be constructed property
within the language of section 341(d) (3). Thus, it will not matter whether, in
determining the holding period or the nature of the property under section
341(d) (3), one "looks through" the holding company to the operating sub-
sidiary, or looks only to the nature of and the holding period in the stock of
the subsidiary.
In the case of constructed or purchased property, will the result be the
same where the individual shareholder incorporates his shares in the operating
company, X Corporation, in Y Corporation, rather than X Corporation incor-
porating the apartment building into Y Corporation? The holding company in
A's hands is not a 'subsection (e) asset because since 341(a) is not applicable
because of (d)(2), and, therefore, the sale or exchange would not result in gain"under any provision of this chapter" which is treated as gain from the sale or
exchange of property which is neither a capital asset nor property described in
1231(b).
74. See DeWind & Anthoine, Collapsible Corporations, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 475, 517
(1956); Axelrad, Tax Advantages and Pitfalls in Collapsible Corporations and Partnerships,
34 Taxes 841, 858 (1956).
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this example, Y Corporation, will acquire the individual shareholder's basis
under section 362 and hence his holding period under section 1223 (2). However,
the X Corporation stock will have been acquired by the individual shareholder
by actual purchase, and under section 341 (b) (2) (B), will be purchased prop-
erty in the hands of Y Corporation. As already noted, this is because the
character of the assets, constructed or purchased, transferred by the individual
is not traced into the shares of stock received by an individual by section
341(b) (2). Since Y holds by purchase, and since purchased stock is not a
section 341 asset, the stock is not referred to by section 341 (d) (3) and its
relief does not apply. Here, the intended relief can be obtained only by a
"look-through" to the assets of X Corporation, which will be constructed or
purchased property within section 341(d) (3), and will also have the benefit of
the individual transferor's holding period. However, a "look-through" is not
necessary if section 341(d) (3) is construed as referring only to the time of
construction or purchase by any of the parties involved, the individual share-
holder, the holding company, or the subsidiary. Such a construction is possible
since section 341(d) (3) refers to the time of completion of the manufacture,
construction, production, or purchase and in this respect is unlike section
341(d) (2) which refers to the property manufactured or purchased. The Regu-
lations would seem to support this construction.
75
THE RELIEF PRovIsioNs OF SECTION 341 (e)
The original definition of a collapsible corporation applied to a corporation
which manufactured, constructed or produced any property, including property
described in section 1231(b). However, purchased 1231(b) property did not
become a collapsible asset until 1954 when it was included in section 341 (b) (3)
as a section 341 asset. Thus, the effect of the statute, as changed, was to make
1231(b) property in the hands of a corporation a collapsible asset, whether con-
structed or purchased, and although the shareholders of the corporation are in-
vestors, rather than dealers, in real estate who could have sold the building at a
capital gain in the absence of a corporation.
Prior to the enactment of section 341(e), taxpayers made an argument,
based upon legislative purpose, that section 341 was inapplicable if the taxpayer
would have had capital gain on a sale of the property had the corporate form
not been used. The Supreme Court held against this position in Braunstein v.
Commissioner7 6 where the Court refused to read into section 341 any additional
requirement that the taxpayer must have been using the corporate form as a
device to convert ordinary income into capital gain. Although the Court noted
as to the legislative purpose of section 341 that "There can of course be no
question that the purpose ... was, as petitioners contend, to close a loophole
that Congress feared could be used to convert ordinary income into capital
gain," it went on to state:
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-4(d) (1955). See also Goldstein, supra note 59, at 235.
76. 374 U.S. 65 (1963).
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But the crucial point for present purposes is that the method chosen
to close this loophole was to establish a carefully and elaborately de-
fined category of transactions in which what might otherwise be a
capital gain would have to be treated as ordinary income. There is no
indication whatever of any congressional desire to have the Commis-
sioner or the courts make a determination in each case as to whether
the use of the corporation was for tax avoidance. Indeed, the drawing
of certain arbitrary lines not here involved-such as making the section
inapplicable to any shareholder owning 10% [now 5%] or less of the
stock or to any gain realized more than three years after the completion
of construction-tends to refute any such indication. It is our under-
standing, in other words, that Congress intended to define what it be-
lieved to be a tax avoidance device rather than to leave the presence
or absence of tax avoidance elements for decision on a case-to-case
basis.
We are reinforced in this conclusion by the practical difficulties-
indeed the impossibilities-of considering without more legislative
guidance than is furnished . . . whether there has in fact been "con-
version" of ordinary income into capital gains in a particular case. For
example, if we were to inquire whether or not the profit would have
been ordinary income had an enterprise been individually owned,
would we treat each taxpaying shareholder differently and look only
to his trade or business or would we consider the matter in terms of
the trade or business of any or at least a substantial number of the
shareholders? There is simply no basis in the statute for a judicial,
resolution of this question, and indeed when Congress addressed itself
to the problem in 1958, it approved an intricate formulation falling
between these two extremes.
As a further example, what if the individual in question is not
himself engaged in any trade or business but owns stock in varying
amounts in a number of corporate ventures other than the one before
the court? Do we pierce each of the corporate veils, regardless of the
extent and share of the individual's investment, and charge him with
being in the trade or business of each such corporation? Again, there
is no basis for a rational judicial answer; the judgment is essentially
a legislative one and in the 1958 amendments Congress enacted a spe-
cific provision, designed to deal with this matter, that is far too com-
plex to be summarized here.
We find no basis in either the terms or the history of [section 341]
for concluding that Congress intended the Commissioner and the courts
to enter this thicket and to arrive at ad hoc determinations for every
taxpayer.
77
77. Id. at 71-73 (footnotes omitted). Braunstein is one of the many cases arising
under section 341 where the corporation constructed apartment buildings and under section
608 of the National Housing Act was able to borrow, on federally insured mortgages, more
than the cost of construction. The excess of the mortgage proceeds over cost of construction
was then distributed to the shareholders before the corporation had earnings and profits,
or -the stock was sold at a gain equal to this excess. The excess might be attributable to
economics in construction, to appreciation in value of land, to uncompensated personal
services of the shareholders, to generous appraisals by the Federal Housing Administration,
or to use of inferior construction materials in violation of the contract upon which federal
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The 1958 legislation referred to by the Court, intended by Congress to
meet the problem posed by the Braunstein situation, is section 341 (e). To refer
to this section as a "thicket" is somewhat to understate its monstrous com-
plexity even as it applies to situations for which it was apparently intended-the
collapsible operating company. When a holding company is introduced into
the problem, the application of section 341 (e) becomes infinitely more com-
plicated, and indeed most often leads to results completely contrary to the
intent of Congress.
Section 341 (e) was intended solely as a relief provision and provides ex-
ceptions to collapsible treatment in four areas:
(1) sales or exchanges of stock, other than redemptions and sales to certain
related persons by shareholders of more than 20 percent;
(2) distributions in complete liquidation under section 331;
(3) complete liquidations which qualify for non-recognition treatment
under section 333; and
(4) at the corporate level, sales or exchanges of property by the corporation
under section 337.
As stated in the Senate Finance Committe Report,78 section 341 (e) has
two main purposes: (1) To protect certain corporations established by investors
as distinguished from dealers in the corporate property from collapsible status.
Examples given are of certain natural resources development corporations, and
real estate corporations established by investors and holding rental property for
investment only; (2) To prevent a shareholder, or a person related to him, from
obtaining from the corporation a distribution of depreciable or like property at
the cost of a single capital gains tax. Hence, transactions are not protected by
341 (e) where as a result of the transaction the property either has a stepped-up
basis for depreciation in the bands of the shareholder, or where the basis could
be stepped-up by a subsequent liquidation to related persons. As with section
1239,79 the purpose is to prevent the shareholder or related person from ac-
quiring a stepped-up basis (which subsequently can be used to offset ordinary
income) at capital gains rates.
No exception of section 341(e) applies if the net unrealized appreciation
in the corporation's "subsection (e) assets" exceeds 15 percent of the net worth
of the corporation. This is characterized by the Regulations as the "general
appraisal relied. See Bittker, Federal Income Estate and Gift Taxation 688 (3d ed. 1964);
Moses, supra note 64, at 188. These windfall profits were part of the factual texture in
Braunstein. The government's argument that the case involved a "blatant" conversion of
ordinary income into capital gain was noted by the Court in footnote 3 of the opinion, and
may somewhat explain the Court's reluctance to give the taxpayer the benefit of legislative
purpose.
78. S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reproduced in 1958-3 Cum. Bull. 922,
943-44.
79. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1239 provides that any gain recognized on the sale or
exchange of depreciable property is taxed to the transferor of such property as ordinary
income if the sale is between certain related persons.
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corporate test"80 and is a requirement that must be met for any one of the
four relief provisions to apply. Also, the relief provided for sales of stock and for
liquidations under 331 is not available unless certain "specific shareholder tests"
are satisfied in addition to the general corporate test.81
The General Corporate Test. Under the general corporate test no taxpayer
may utilize the provisions of section 341 (e) unless the net unrealized apprecia-
tion in the "subsection (e) assets" of the corporation does not exceed 15 percent
of the net worth of the corporation.8 2 Subsection (e) assets in general are those
assets of the corporation gain from the sale of which by the corporation or by
any actual or constructive shareholder who is considered to own more than 20
percent of the corporation's stock-.(more than five percent in the case of liquida-
tions under section 333) would be considered ordinary income. 83 Thus, if any
80. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.341-6(a)(4) and (c)(2) (1965).
81. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 341(e) (1) CB) and (C), 341(e)(2)(B) and (C); Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.341-6(a)(5) and (c)(3) (1965).
82. Net unrealized appreciation is defined in section 341(e) (6) as the amount by which
unrealized appreciation in assets exceeds unrealized depreciation in assets. In turn, unrealized
appreciation and unrealized depredation are determined by measuring the fair market
value of each asset against its adjusted basis. Net worth is defined in section 341 (e) (7)
as the excess of the fair market value of the assets of the corporation over its liabilities.
83. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 341(e)(5); Treas. Reg. § 1.341-6(a)(4). Section
341(e) (5) provides:
(5) SuasEcnox (e) AssL-r DaxINE.
(A) For purposes of paragraphs (1), (2) and (4), the term "subsection (e)
asset" means, with respect to property held by any corporation-
(i) property (except property used in the trade or business, as defined
in paragraph (9)) which in the hands of the corporation is, or, in
the hands of a shareholder who owns more than 20 percent in
value of the outstanding stock of the corporation, would be, prop-
erty gain from the sale or exchange of which under any provision
of this chapter be considered in whole or in part as gain from the
sale or exchange of property which is neither a capital asset nor
property described in section 1231 (b) ;
(ii) property used in the trade or business (as defined in paragraph
(9)), but only if the unrealized depreciation on all such property
on which there is unrealized depreciation exceeds the unrealized
appreciation on all such property on which there is unrealized
appreciation;
(ii) if there is net unrealized appreciation on all property used in the
trade or business (as defined in paragraph (9)), property used in
the trade or business (as defined in paragraph (9)) which, in the
hands of a shareholder who owns more than 20 percent in value of
the outstanding stock of the corporation, would be property gain
from the sale or exchange of which would under any provision
of this chapter be considered in whole or in part as gain from the
sale or exchange of property which is neither a capital asset nor
property described in section 1231(b) ; and
(iv) property (unless included under clause (i), (ii), or (iii)) which
consists of a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition,
or similar property, or any interest in any such property, if the
property was created in whole or in part by the persbnal efforts
of any individual who owns more than 5 percent in value of the
stock of the corporation.
The determination as to whether property of the corporation in the hands of the
corporation is, or in the hands of a shareholder would be, property gain from the
sale or exchange of which would under any provision in this chapter be considered
in whole or in part as gain from the sale or exchange of property which is neither
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more than 20 percent shareholder (five percent in the case of section 333 liquida-
tions) is a dealer in the property of the corporation that property is a subsection
(e) asset, and if its net unrealized appreciation, together with the net unrealized
appreciation of other subsection (e) assets, exceeds 15 percent of the net worth
of the corporation, no exception provided in section 341 (e) may be availed of
by anyone, including investor-shareholders.
Specific Skarekolder Tests. Even if the general corporate test is met, a
shareholder may be denied relief on a sale of his stock or upon a complete
liquidation of the corporation if he owns more than five percent of the stock,
actually or constructively, and fails to satisfy the applicable specific shareholder
test.84 This test is best considered in the context of the particular provisions
of section 341(e), discussion of which follows.
Section 341(e)(1): Relief for Sales of Stock.
A sale or exchange of stock, other than to the issuing corporation and to
certain related persons, will be exempt from the operation of section 341 (a) (1)
as follows:
1) If the shareholder owns no more than five percent of the stock, only the
general corporate test need be satisfied. The corporation is not a collapsible
corporation with respect to a sale by him of his stock if the net unrealized appre-
ciation in the subsection (e) assets of the corporation does not exceed 15 percent
of the net worth of the corporation. 85
2) If the shareholder owns more than five percent and no more than 20 percent
of the stock, actually or constructively, he must take into account the net un-
realized appreciation not only of the subsection (e) assets of the corporation,
but also of any other assets of the corporation which would be subsection (e)
assets of the corporation under clauses (i) and (iii) of section 341 (e) (5) (A) if
a capital asset nor property described in section 1231(b) shall be made as if all
property of the corporation had been sold or exchanged to one person in one
transaction.
(B) For purposes of paragraph (3), the term "subsection (e) asset" means,
with respect to property held by any corporation, property described in clauses
(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) of subparagraph (A), except that clauses () and (iii)
shall apply in respect of any shareholder who owns more than 5 percent in value
of the outstanding stock of the corporation (in lieu of any shareholder who owns
more than 20 percent in value of such stock).
The determination of whether gain on the sale of property would be ordinary income
or capital gain is made without regard to the application of sections 1245 and 1250. Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 341(e)(12); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.34.1-6(b)(1), (2) and (n) (1965).
84. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 341(e) (1) (B) and (C), 341(e) (2) (B) and (C); Treas.
Reg. § 1.341-6(a)(5) (1965).
85. Such a-shareholder might also escape collapsible treatment under § 341(d) (1), which
makes § 341(a) inapplicable to certain not-more-than-five-percent shareholders. However,
section 341(d)(1) is more limited in its operation since it excludes from relief any share-
holder who owned more than five percent of the stock at any time after the start of
manufacture, etc., as well as any shareholder whose shares are attributed to a more-than-
five-percent shareholder. See Bittker, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Share-
holders 315 (1959).
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he owned more than 20 percent of the stock. In other words, he must also take
into account the net unrealized appreciation on any corporation non-subsection
(e) assets which if sold by him would give rise to ordinary income. He may
avail himself of (e) (1) only if this amount of net unrealized appreciation does
not exceed 15 percent of the corporation's net worth.
3) If the shareholder owns more than 20 percent of the stock, actually or con-
structively, he must take into account the net unrealized appreciation on cor-
porate subsection (e)- assets and on any other corporate assets which, after
attributing to him certain sales of stock and of corporate assets of certain related
corporations in which he has an interest, would be ordinary income assets in his
hands. This amount of net unrealized appreciation may not exceed 15 percent
of the corporation's net worth in order for such a shareholder to use section
341(e).80
This provision, section 341(e) (1) (C), is the most complex provision in
an already overly complicated statute. Essentially it means that as to a more-
than-20-percent shareholder who has, or during the past three years has had, a
more-than-20-percent stock interest in other corporations, it is necessary to
determine whether more than 70 percent in value of the assets of any of the
other corporations are "assets similar or related in service or use" to more than
70 percent in value of the assets of the corporation whose stock is being sold.
If so, the shareholder is treated as though any sale by him of stock in the other
corporations had been a sale of his proportionate share of the corporate assets,
and as though any sale of its assets by the other corporation, gain or loss on
which was not recognized under section 337, had been a sale by him of his
proportionate share of the property sold. If after making the shareholder the
hypothetical seller of these assets he is a dealer as to the property held by the
corporation whose stock he is selling, he can only use section 341(e) (1) if the
net unrealized appreciation in that property and in any subsection (e) assets of
the corporation does not exceed 15 percent of the net worth of the corporation.87
86. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 341(e) (1) (C); Treas. Reg. § 1.341-6(c) (3) (1965).
87. S. Rep. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reproduced in 1958-3 Cum. Bull. 955, gives the
following example of the operation of section 341(e) (1):
The application of the provision added by your committee, in the case of sales or
exchanges of stock, may be illustrated by the following examples: Assume that
the sole asset of a corporation is appreciated land, and that the corporation is
not a dealer in such property. If no shareholder of the corporation owning more
than 20 percent of the corporation's stock is a dealer in such land (and if no
more-than-20-percent shareholder owns, or has owned, within the preceding 3
years, more than 20 percent of the stock in a corporation more than 70 percent
in value of whose assets are property similar or related in service or use to, the
assets of this corporation) then gain from sale of stock by any shareholder owning
more than 20 percent of the corporation's stock will not come within the pro-
visions of section 341(a). If, on the other hand, a shareholder owning more than
20 percent in value of the corporation's stock is a dealer in land, no sale of stock
by any shareholder in the corporation will come within the statutory exception
added by your committee. If no shareholder owning more than 20 percent of the
corporation's stock is a dealer in land, but a 21-percent shareholder has owned
and sold, within the past 3 years, similar stock interests in corporations having
similar property, then such sales of stock shall be taken into account, as to that
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The following example illustrates the operation of section 341 (e) (1).88
Assume that a corporation has three stockholders, unrelated to each




Assume also that the corporation's assets fall into four categories,
as follows:
Class Net unrealized Nature of asset
appreciation
W $10,000 Stock in trade in hands of
corporation
X $10,000 Capital asset to corporation;
but would be stock in trade
if held by C, though not if
held by A or B.
Y $10,000 Capital asset to corporation;
but would be stock in trade
if held by B, though not if
held by A or C.
Z $20,000 Capital asset to corporation;
but would be stock in trade
if held by C, but only if
sales by certain corporations
in which C was interested
during preceding 3 years were
treated as sales by C or if
sales by C of stock in such
corporations were treated as
sales by him of his share of
assets.
Under § 341(e) (5) (A), the corporation's "subsection (e) assets"
would include Classes W and X. Consequently, on a sale of stock by
A the net unrealized appreciation of the corporation would be $20,000,
and if this does not exceed 15 percent of the corporation's net worth,
the corporation could not be collapsible as to A. On a sale of stock by
B, however, the net unrealized appreciation would be $30,000, since
§ 341(e) (1) (A) and (B) require him to take into account not only
the corporation's "subsection (e) assets" (Classes W and X), but also
any corporate assets which would be "subsection (e) assets" if he held
more than 20 percent of the stock (Class Y). B, therefore, can take ad-
shareholder only, in ascertaining whether he is a dealer and therefore is prevented
from coming under the exception. Similarly, if no shareholder owning more than
20 percent in value of the corporation's stock is a dealer in land, but a shareholder
owning 6 percent of the corporation's stock is a dealer in such land, a sale of stock
by the 6-percent shareholder will not qualify under the exception, notwithstanding
the fact that sales of stock by other shareholders may qualify.
88. Bittker, op. cit. supra note 85, at 316-17.
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vantage of § 341(e) (1) only if $30,000 does not exceed 15 percent of
the corporation's net worth. Finally, if C invokes § 341 (e) (1), he must
take into account Classes W, X, and Z (but not Class Y) in deter-
mining the net unrealized appreciation. § 341(e) (1) (A) and (C). For
him, § 341(e) (1) will be applicable only if $40,000 does not exceed
15 percent of the corporation's net worth. 9
The Holding Company and Section 341(e) (1). A comparison of the appli-
cation of section 341(e) (1) to the holding company and non-holding company
situations will be facilitated by some very simple examples:
Situation I. The Non-Holding Company and Investor Shareholders
X Corporation has outstanding 100 shares of stock owned 85 by A, 10 by
B, and five by C. The only significant asset owned by X Corporation is an
apartment building which it holds for rental. The net unrealized appreciation
in the apartment building is 20,000 dollars and the net worth of X Corporation
is 100,000 dollars. Neither A nor B are dealers in real estate and A does not
own stock in any other corporations.
The apartment building is not a subsection (e) asset within clause (i) of
(e) (5) (A), since it is section 1231(b) property.9 0  or is it a subsection (e)
asset within clause (iii) of (e) (5) (A) because its sale by A will not give rise to
ordinary income. The general corporate test is satisfied since the corporation
has no subsection (e) assets and the net unrealized appreciation in such assets
is zero. Since C does not own more than five percent of the stock, section
341(e) (1) exempts from section 341 (a) gain from the sale by C of his stock.
Both A and B satisfy their respective specific shareholder tests: B is not
89. Professor Bittker continues:
For another example, which is both simpler and more typical of § 341(e)'s intended
operation, assume a corporation (Smith-Jones, Inc.) owned equally by Smith and
and Jones (who are unrelated), the sole asset of which is an appreciated apart-
ment house. Assume also that neither Smith nor Jones is a dealer in such property,
but that Jones has owned more than 20 percent of the stock of certain other real
estate corporations during the preceding 3 years. In these circumstances, Smith-
Jones, Inc. owns no "subsection (e) assets," either in its own right or by attribu-
tion from Smith or Jones. As to Smith, the net unrealized appreciation under
§ 341(e) (1) is zero, so a sale or exchange of his stock (except to the issuing
corporation or to a "related person") is exempt from the operation of § 341(a) (1).
As to Jones, it is necessary to determine whether more than 70 percent in value of
the .assets of any of the other corporations are similar or related in use or service
to the property held by Smith-Jones, Inc. If so, Jones is to be treated (a) as though
any sale or exchange by him of stock in such other corporation (while he owned
more than 20 percent of its stock) had been a sale by him of his proportionate
share of the corporation's assets, and (b) as though any sale or exchange by such
other corporation (while he owned more than 20 percent of its stock) which was
subject to § 337(a) had been a sale by Jones of his proportionate share of the
property. If, taking into account these hypothetical sales or exchanges by Jones,
he would have been a dealer in the type of property held by Smith-Jones, Inc.,
he can make use of § 341(e)(1) only if the net unrealized appreciation in the
property of Smith-Jones, Inc. does not exceed 15 percent of the corporation's
net worth.
Bittker, supra note 85, at 317-18.
90. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 341(e) (5) (A) (i), and (e)(9).
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an actual dealer in real estate and A cannot be a hypothetical dealer since
he owns no stock in other corporations. Hence, as to both A and B, the net
unrealized appreciation under section 341 (e) (1) is zero and each of them quali-
fies for the (e) (1) relief on the sale of his stock.
If B were an actual dealer in real estate, the apartment building would be
a subsection (e) asset only as to a sale of stock by B and would not affect other
shareholders. 91
Situation II. The Non-Holding Company and a Hypothetical-Dealer Share-
holder
The situation is the same as Situation I except that A owns 21 percent
of the stock in another corporation in the business of renting apartment houses,
one-third of which stock he has sold in the past three years. A has also owned
during the past three years all the stock in other related corporations which
have sold their assets under section 337 and liquidated. A is considered as
having sold a seven percent interest in one apartment house and a 100 percent
interest in the apartment houses sold by the liquidated corporations. Assuming
such activity makes A a dealer in apartment buildings, in the hands of A the
apartment building owned by X Corporation would be an ordinary income asset
and hence a subsection (e) asset, the net unrealized appreciation in which must
be taken into account on a sale by A of his X Corporation stock. Since such
appreciation exceeds 15 percent of the net worth of X Corporation A may not
avail himself of (e) (1) to prevent the application of (a) (1) to the gain from
the sale of his X Corporation stock.
The sales by related corporations of their assets and A's sales of stock in
related corporations are taken into account only with regard to a sale of X
Corporation stock by A. Such sales are not taken into account in determining
whether the general corporate test is met, or whether the specific shareholder
test of a more-than-five-percent-and-not-more-than-twenty-percent shareholder
is met.9 2 Hence, the general corporate test continues to be met and C may utilize
section 341(e) (1) upon a sale of his X Corporation stock. Also, B continues
to meet the specific shareholder test and he may also use section 341(e) (1) to
obtain capital gain on a sale by him of his X Corporation stock.
Situation II. The Holding Company and Investor-Shareholders
The situation is the same as Situation I except that X Corporation, the
stock of which is owned by A, B and C (85 percent, 10 percent and 5 percent
respectively), owns all the stock of Y Corporation which owns the apartment
building for rental purposes. The net unrealized appreciation in both the stock
of Y Corporation and in the apartment building is 20,000 dollars and the net
worth of both corporations is 100,000 dollars.
91. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-6(c)(4) (1965).
92. See Treas. Reg. § 1.341-6(d)(4) (1965).
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On a sale of X Corporation stock by A, B and C, how is it to be determined
whether the general corporate test and specific shareholder tests are met? The
complexity of section 341(e) makes tempting the use of the simplest solution:
look through the assets of the parent to the assets of the subsidiary, thus dis-
regarding the holding company entirely. This could be easily accomplished where
the holding company owns nothing but the stock of the subsidiary operating
company, as in this situation. Where the holding company owns operating as-
sets together with the stock of the subsidiary, the holding company cannot be
disregarded. However, the parent and the subsidiary could be treated as a
single corporation owning only the operating assets of both corporations.
Although the "look-through" approach may eventually be adopted either
by the courts or by Congress, there is at present no statutory warrant for it.
In the definition of a collapsible corporation, section 341(b) (1) specifically
takes into account and does not disregard the presence of a holding company.
Presumably, it is to be taken into account and not disregarded for the purposes
of section 341(e). The Conference Committee Report supports this view in the
only reference the Committee Reports make to the holding company problem:
It is the understanding of the conferees that, in applying the defini-
tion of subsection (e) assets, stock or securities held by a corpora-
tion (hereinafter referred to as "Corporation A") shall not be con-
sidered subsection (e) assets merely because a more than 20 percent
shareholder is a dealer in stock or securities, if such shareholder holds
his Corporation A stock in his investment account (pursuant to section
1236(a)). Therefore, the stock or securities held by Corporation A
shall not be subsection (e) assets by reason of the more than 20 per-
cent shareholder test unless, in the hands of such shareholder, the stock
or securities held by Corporation A would, if held by such a share-
holder, constitute property gain from the sale of which would be con-
sidered ordinary income solely by reason of the application of section
341 as modified by this amendment. 93
The Regulations adopt the above rule and make dealer status as to stock
or securities irrelevant in the definition of a subsection (e) asset if the holding
company stock is held in the dealer's investment account pursuant to section
1236(a).94 The Example in the Regulations also makes it clear that it is the
stock in the subsidiary that is to be tested for subsection (e) status, and not
the assets owned by the subsidiary:
Example. Jones, a more-than-20-percent actual shareholder in the cor-
poration X holds his X stock in an investment account in the manner
prescribed in section 1236(a). Jones is a dealer in stock and securities
and holds land for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade
or business. No other actual or constructive shareholder is a dealer in
stock and securities or so holds land. X holds all of the stock in cor-
poration Y, a collapsible corporation within the meaning of section
93. Conf. Rept. No. 2632, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reproduced in 1958-3 Cum. Bull. 1210.
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-6(b) (5) (1965).
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341 (b). Y's sole asset is land on which unrealized appreciation exceeds
15 percent of Y's net worth. Since Jones holds his X stock in an
investment account pursuant to section 1236(a), the Y stock can-
not be considered a subsection (e) asset of the X Corporation merely
because Jones is a dealer in stock and securities. Nevertheless, the Y
stock is a subsection (e) asset of the X Corporation because if Jones
were treated as having sold the Y stock, his gain would be treated as
gain from the sale of property which is not a capital asset by reason
of the application of section 341. If, however, the net unrealized ap-
preciation on Y's land did not exceed 15 percent of Y's net worth the
Y stock would not be a subsection (e) asset since section 341(e) (1)
would except such sale from the application of section 341.0r
In the above example, if X corporation were to be disregarded, there could
also be disregarded the stock of Y Corporation and the provisions regarding
stock and securities dealers would be unnecessary. Jones could be treated as if
he owned the Y stock directly, and the land owned by Y Corporation, rather
than the stock of Y Corporation, would be the subsection (e) asset.
It appears then, that in Situation III, on a sale of X Corporation stock by
A, B and C the asset to be tested for subsection (e) status is the sole asset of
X Corporation, the Y Corporation stock. Only if the Y Corporation stock is
not an ordinary income asset in the hands of X Corporation and A, can relief
be obtained under section 341(e) (1) on a sale of X Corporation stock.
The general corporate test. The Y stock is not an ordinary income asset
in the hands of either X Corporation or A since neither is a dealer in stock or
securities. ° 6 However, Y stock is stock in a collapsible corporation gain from
the sale of which by either X Corporation or A would give rise to ordinary in-
come under section 341(a). Hence, Y stock is a subsection (e) asset of X Cor-
poration and the general corporate test is not satisfied, unless the hypothetical
sale of Y stock by X Corporation and A is exempted from the operation of
section 341 (a).
Such a sale of Y stock will be exempted from 341 (a) if the 70-30 limita-
tion of section 341(d) (2) applies, or if the three year limitation of section
341(d) (3) applies to the sale. In other words, if under (d) (2) or (d) (3) X
Corporation and A would receive capital gain on the hypothetical sale of Y
stock, then Y stock is not a subsection (e) asset of X Corporation and the
general corporate test has been satisfied.
If section 341 (d) (2) and (d) (3) do not apply to the hypothetical sale of
Y stock by X Corporation and A, will (e) (1) apply to give them capital gain
on the sale? For, if (e) (1) applies to such sales, Y Corporation will not be a
collapsible corporation with respect thereto and the sales are protected from
95. Ibid.
96. Even if A were such a dealer, that fact would be disregarded for this purpose if his
X Corporation stock were held in his investment account pursuant to section 1236(a). Of
course, if X Corporation were a dealer in stock or securities, it could protect the invest-
ment character of the Y Corporation stock by holding it in its investment account pursuant
to section 1236(a).
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341 (a) (1) and hence result in capital gain so that Y stock is not a subsection
(e) asset of X Corporation.
Applying section 341 (e) (1), on the hypothetical sale of Y stock by X Cor-
poration and A, Y Corporation will not be collapsible with respect to such sales
if the general corporate test and specific shareholder tests are satisfied. The
apartment building, tested in the hands of X Corporation and A, does not give
rise to ordinary income since neither X Corporation nor A is a dealer in real
estate. Hence, the building is not a subsection (e) asset of Y Corporation. The
net unrealized appreciation under the general corporate test is zero, and that test
is satisfied by Y Corporation. Also, X Corporation and A both satisfy the
specific shareholder test for more-than-20-percent shareholders 7 X Corporation
owns no stock in any other corporations; A has no interest in any other corpora-
tion except X Corporation which does not hold assets related in service or use to
those of Y Corporation.9" The net unrealized appreciation to be taken into
97. For purposes of determining the percentage of Y stock which is owned by X
Corporation and A, section 341 (e) (10) applies the attribution rules of section 544(a) (1).
Under these rules, Y stock is owned as follows: X Corporation, 100 percent; A, 80 percent;
B, 10 percent; and C, 5 percent.
98. The question of whether shares of stock in a corporation operating real estate is
property "similar to" the real estate of the operating company to which section 341 (e) (1) is
being applied, Y Corporation in this example, is a difficult one. It does not appear to be
relevant here since section 341(e)(1)(C) does not take into account sales of property or
stock of the corporation to which section 341(e)(1) is being applied, here Y Corporation.
Thus, any sales by X Corporation within three years of Y stock should not be attributed
to A since there would be no such attribution if A himself had owned Y stock and sold it.
However, suppose that during the past three years A had owned more than 20 percent
of the stock in other holding companies which in turn had owned all the stock of sub-
sidiaries operating apartment buildings and that these subsidiaries had engaged in sales of
assets under section 337. Are these asset sales to be attributed to A in considering his
hypothetical dealer status with regard to the apartment building owned by Y? If they are
not, there is a serious gap in the statute. It will catch dealers who operate in the corporate
form through direct ownership of stock in operating companies, but not those who own
only the stock of holding companies which own operating companies. Whether the courts
will hold that such asset sales would be attributed to A is problematical. It would require
that the holding companies be looked through and that A be treated as if he owned the
operating companies directly. On the other hand, if the stock held by the other holding
companies had been sold under section 337, or if A had sold his stock in the other holding
companies, A would be treated as having sold the stock held by the holding companies.
The question now arises whether such stock will be held "assets similar or related in service
or use" to the apartment building held by Y. This phrase is borrowed from section 1033
and has the same meaning as under section 1033, without regard to section 1033(g). Treas.
Reg. § 1.341-6(d)(1) (1965). Section 1033 provides for non-recognition of gain on an in-
voluntary conversion of property when there is purchased other property "similar or
related in service or use to the property so converted, or . . . stock in the acquisition of
control of a corporation owning such other property." Under this language, stock in a
corporation which owns all the stock of a subsidiary which owns property similar to that
converted is treated as similar property to that converted. Does this mean that for purposes
of section 341(e)(1)(C) stock in a holding company of a subsidiary which holds property
similar to that of an operating company being tested under section 341(e)(1), is similar to
the property of the operating company? It would seem not, at least under the literal
language of the statute. Section 341 (e) (1) (C) and Treas. Reg. § 1.341-6(d) (1) and (2)
make no such equation in defining similar property. Also, the equating of the two in section
1033 is very limited. See section 1033(g) (2) (A). See generally Anthoine, The Corporate
Election and Collapsible Amendment, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1146, 1190 (1958). And the
Service has held against the taxpaper where he argued for such a construction under
sections 1033 and 1071. Rev. Rul. 66-33, 1966-6 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 11. The Ruling held that
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account under these tests is zero as to both X Corporation and A. Thus, the net
unrealized appreciation to be taken into account under section 341 (e) (1) on the
hypothetical sale of Y stock by A and X Corporation is zero and Y Corporation
is not collapsible with respect to these sales. X Corporation and A would both
get capital gain on the sales and Y stock is not a subsection (e) asset of X
Corporation.99 As a result, X Corporation has no subsection (e) assets and the
general corporate test is satisfied by X Corporation.
The specific shareholder tests. Since X Corporation satisfies the general cor-
porate test, C may sell his X stock under section 341(e) (1) at capital gains.
He need satisfy no specific shareholder test since he owns only five percent of
the stock.
As to B however, since he owns ten percent of X stock, both the general
corporate test and the specific shareholder test of section 341(e) (1) (B) must
be satisfied. Therefore, if the Y stock is an ordinary income asset in the hands
of B, he may not avail himself of (e) (1). On a hypothetical sale of Y stock,
B would get capital gain if the 70-30 limitation of (d) (2) or the three year limi-
tation of (d) (3) applied to such a sale. If they did not apply, B would also have
to resort to (e) (1), under which the analysis would be the same as on such a
sale by X Corporation and A. As we have seen, the net unrealized appreciation
under the general corporate test would be zero, so Y Corporation satisfies this
test. B satisfies the applicable specific shareholder test because the apartment
building owned by Y Corporation is a section 1231 (b) asset gain from the sale
of which by B would be capital gain. Hence, the net unrealized appreciation in
a purchase of stock of a corporation which in turn owned all the stock of an operating
corporation which owned "similar" property did not qualify as the purchase of the stock of
the operating company. Since stock of a holding company owning all the stock of an
operating company which owns property "similar" to that converted is not property
similar to such converted property, or to the stock of such an operating company, by a
parity of reasoning stock of an operating company which owns property similar to that of
another operating company is not property "similar" to the assets of the other operating
company. Such a holding company would not be related to the operating company and
sales of its assets or its stock would not be taken into account under section 341(e) (1) (C),
on the hypothetical sale of Y stock. However, they would be taken into account in
determining A's status as a hypothetical dealer in stock when section 341(e)(1) is applied
to the sale by A of his stock in X Corporation. See note 100, infra.
99. It should be noted that section 341 (e) (1) applies to the hypothetical sale of Y
stock only if the sale is not a redemption or to a related person. Obviously, the statute
is not drafted to apply to a hypothetical sale. But this limitation of (e) (1) is irrelevant to
a hypothetical sale as its purpose, as already noted, is to keep depreciable corporate assets
out of the hands of a shareholder or a person related to him, so that no stepped-up basis may
be obtained in those assets at capital gain rates. This purpose is served when the limitation
is applied to the disposition of X Corporation stock and can be ignored on the hypothetical
sale of Y stock, as indeed it must be since it is not capable of literal application to the
latter situation. The use of (e) (1) to take a hypothetical sale of Y stock out of section 341(a)
is implicitly approved by both the Conference Committee Report (see text accompanying
note 93, supra) and Treas. Reg. § 1.341-6(b) (5) (see text accompanying notes 94-95,
supra). In the Example in the Regulation, if Jones were not a dealer in land, the land
would not be a subsection (e) asset of Y Corporation on the sale of Y stock by Jones or any
other more-than-20-percent shareholder of Y Corporation. The net unrealized appreciation in
the subsection (e) assets of Y would be zero, and "the Y stock would not be a subsection (e)
asset [of X Corporation] since section 341(e) (1) would except such sale from the applica-
tion of section 341."
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the subsection (e) assets of Y Corporation to be taken into account under
(e) (1) on the hypothetical sale of Y stock would be zero and Y Corporation
would not be collapsible on a sale of its stock by B. B would get capital gain,
not ordinary income, on a sale of Y stock and as a result, the net unrealized
appreciation in the Y stock is not taken into account under (e) (1) (B) on a
sale by B of his X stock. Thus the net unrealized appreciation of X Corporation
assets to be taken into account on B's sale of X stock is zero, B satisfies the
applicable specific shareholder test, and X Corporation is not collapsible with
respect to the sale of its stock by B. B would get capital gain on such a sale.
A may obtain capital gain under (e) (1) on the sale of his X stock only if
the Y stock is not an ordinary income asset in his hands. As we have seen, A
will get capital gain on a hypothetical sale of Y stock if (d) (2) or (d) (3) were
to apply to such a sale. If these provisions do not apply, and if A can get capital
gain only under (e) (1), there must be satisfied the general corporate test and
the specific shareholder test of (e) (1) (C). The general corporate test is satis-
fied because on a hypothetical sale by X Corporation and A of Y stock, as we
have already seen, both would receive capital gain under (e) (1) because Y Cor-
poration is not collapsible as to these sales, since, as to these sales of Y stock,
Y Corporation has satisfied the general corporate and both X Corporation and
A have satisfied the applicable specific shareholder tests. Hence, the Y stock is
not a subsection (e) asset of X Corporation and the unrealized appreciation to
be taken into account under this test is zero. However, A has not satisfied the
specific shareholder test as to his sale of X stock. The only question here is
whether A is a hypothetical dealer in stock or securities. Since A owns no stock
in any other corporations except Y Corporation (by attribution), and since Y
assets are not related to those of X Corporation, and also because A cannot
have sold any Y stock, A cannot be a hypothetical dealer in stock or securities,
and the specific shareholder test is satisfied. 100 Hence, as to A, the net unrealized
100. Stock held by A in other corporations which hold apartment buildings for rental
would not be stock in corporations "related" to X Corporation. But, any sales of stock of
those other corporations, or of their assets under section 337, would be attributed to A on
his hypothetical sale of Y stock and thus this situation could not give rise to avoidance of
the hypothetical dealer provisions. See note 98 supra. If, however, A were to hold or have
held stock in other holding companies which in turn own stock of subsidiaries which held
rental real estate, sales of stock by A of such holding companies, and sales by the holding
companies of assets under section 337, should be taken into account with regard to A's
hypothetical dealer status on the sale of his X stock. Nor should the use of section 1236(a)
for the holding company stock be relevant. Otherwise there would be a disparity of treat-
ment between situations where a person such as A is a shareholder of holding companies
rather than of operating companies. And perhaps there is a built-in disparity anyway
because the -tests which apply to determine securities dealers are different from those used
to determine real estate dealers. Compare Achille 0. Van Suetendael, Par. 44,305 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. (1944), aff'd per curiam, sub norn. Van Suetendael v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 654 (2d
Cir. 1945), and Commissioner v. Burnett, 118 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1941), and Smith v.
Commissioner, 33 T.C. 465 (1959) with Mauldin v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 714 (10th Cir.
1952) and Black v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 204 (1941). But see Herman Katz, 19 Tax
Ct. Mem. 1035 (1960), and Saul Wilson, 20 Tax Ct. Mem. 583 (1961). The best solution
to -this problem is to treat sales of stock and assets of other holding companies as sales of
assets of the subsidiaries in testing the sale of Y stock for subsection (e) status. See note
98, supra.
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appreciation to be taken into account under (e) (1) is zero, A has satisfied the
specific shareholder test, and X Corporation is not collapsible with respect to
a sale of its stock by A.
Thus, in Situation III where X Corporation owns only the Y Corporation
stock, and A, B and C, the shareholders of X Corporation, are neither actual
nor hypothetical dealers in real estate, A, B and C may sell the X Corporation
stock at capital gain rates under section 341(e) (1).
Situation IV. The Holding Company and a Hypothetical-Dealer Shareholder
The Situation is the same as Situation III except that, as in Situation II,
A is a hypothetical dealer in apartment buildings due to his stock interests in
various other corporations. In Situation II, where X Corporation held the real
estate, it will be recalled that B and C could utilize section 341(e) (1) to ob-
tain capital gain on a sale of X stock. It was only A who was barred from (e) (1)
relief because of his hypothetical dealer status. Presumably this result should
not be changed merely because X Corporation is a holding company which owns
all of the Y stock, with Y operating the apartment building. However, a literal
application of section 341(e) (1) does change the result.
As in Situation III, on a sale of X Corporation stock by A, B and C, the
asset to be tested for subsection (e) status is the sole asset of X Corporation,
the Y Corporation stock. Only if this stock is not an ordinary income asset in
the hands of X Corporation and A, can relief be obtained under (e) (1) on a
sale by A, B and C of their X Corporation stock.
The general corporate test. The Y stock is not an ordinary income asset in
the hands of either X Corporation or A since neither is a dealer in stock or
securities, and if A were such a dealer, this fact would be disregarded for this
purpose if his X Corporation stock were held in his investment account pur-
suant to section 1236. However, since Y stock is stock in a collapsible corpora-
tion, its sale would give ordinary income both to X Corporation and to A, and
it would be a subsection (e) asset of X Corporation, unless the hypothetical
sales are exempted from the operation of section 341(a). If (d)(2) and (d)(3)
do not apply to allow such exemption, (e) (1), literally applied, will not provide
the relief. Since A is a hypothetical dealer in real estate, the apartment building
owned by Y Corporation would be considered a subsection (e) asset of Y Cor-
poration, the net unrealized appreciation of which must be taken into account
on the hypothetical sale of Y stock by A. Since this appreciation exceeds 15
percent of Y's net worth, (e) (1) does not apply to make Y Corporation non-
collapsible with respect to a sale of Y stock by A. Hence, under section 341(a),
A would receive ordinary income on such a sale. Because gain from a sale of
Y stock by A would be ordinary income, Y stock is a subsection (e) asset of
X Corporation and, since the requisite net unrealized appreciation is present,
no shareholder of X Corporation may avail himself of (e) (1) on a sale of X
Corporation stock. This result follows even though only A would have been
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barred from the use of (e)(1) if X Corporation held the apartment building
directly, Situation II, above. In this situation the presence of a holding company
defeats the intent of Congress to allow B and C relief under (e) (1) on a sale
of X Corporation stock. Such relief can be obtained only by an application of
legislative history, a remedy the Supreme Court has refused to apply in a re-
lated situation in Braunstein.
Section 341(e)(2) and (4): Relief for Complete Liquidations
A shareholder's gain on a complete liquidation of a corporation will qualify
for capital gains treatment under section 341(e) (2) if two conditions are met.
First, the general corporate test and specific shareholder tests, which are the
same as under section 341 (e) (1), must be met. As to this condition, the analy-
sis for all four of the above Situations would be the same except that the tests
must be met for the whole period of time after the adoption of the plan of
liquidation, whereas under (e) (1) they need be met only at the time of the
sale of the stock. The second condition is that section 337(a) applies to sales
or exchanges of corporate property by reason of section 341 (e) (4). 101 Under
(e) (4), section 337 will apply to sales of property by the corporation within
the 12 month period beginning on the date of the adoption of the plan of liquida-
tion if the general corporate test is met, if the corporation sells substantially all
its properties, and if it does not distribute to its shareholders any depreciable
or similar properties. Section 337 is prevented from applying to sales of de-
preciable and like property when they are made to more-than-20-percent share-
holders or certain persons related to such shareholders.
In the situation where no holding company is present, as in Situations I
and II, the literal application of section 341(e) (2) and (e) (4) has meaning and
operates much as (e) (1) does on a sale of stock by the shareholders: capital
gain is given on the liquidation of X Corporation if there is not present more
than 15 percent of the net worth in unrealized appreciation under the general
corporate and specific shareholder tests, and, as in the case of a sale of stock,
the depreciable assets of the corporation are kept out of the hands of the share-
holder or persons related to him so that a stepped-up basis (which could there-
after be written off against ordinary income) cannot be obtained at capital
gains rates.'0 2
101. By reason of section 337(c)(1), section 337 does not apply to any sale made
by a collapsible corporation as defined in section 34-1(b). This prevents a collapsible corpora-
tion from selling its assets without recognition of gain under section 337 with the share-
holders escaping the operation of section 341(a) on the subsequent liquidation because the
corporation would have realized (although not recognized) its gain and hence would no
longer be collapsible under section 341(b) (1). There is an argument that a sale of assets by
the corporation results in a realization of gain so that it is not a collapsible corporation and
hence is not within the statutory prohibition against use of section 337. See Bittker, op. cit.
supra note 85, at 295. However, Treas. Reg. § 1.337-1 rejects this literal construction of the
statute by providing that section 337 does not apply to any sale of property by the corpo-
ration whenever a distribution of such property in partial or complete liquidation would
have been subject to section 341(a).
.102. There are, however, ways in which section 341(e) (4) may be used which were
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In the holding company situation where A is not a hypothetical dealer in
land, Situation III, section 341 (e) (2) and (e) (4) become extremely clumsy in
their operation. As in the application of (e) (1) to this situation, the Y stock
would not be a subsection (e) asset of X Corporation and the general corporate
test of (e)(2) and (e)(4), and also the specific shareholder tests of (e)(2),
could be met. However, the requirements that there be a sale of assets of X
Corporation under section 337 has no meaningful application since X Corpora-
tion owns only Y stock. There is no depreciable property involved. If this re-
quirement is literally applied, then (e) (2) and (e) (4) lose all their value to
X Corporation in this situation since the same result can be accomplished under
(e) (1) by a sale of X stock. A proper result can be reached only by "unwind-
ing" the corporate structure. Y Corporation could be liquidated under section
332 tax-free to X Corporation so that there would be no gain upon which sec-
tion 341 (a) would operate. 10 3 The situation reverts to Situation I where X
owns the apartment building directly, and (e) (2) and (e) (4) can then be used
in their intended manner in the liquidation of X Corporation. 10 4
never intended by Congress. Where the corporation holds loss property, it may sell it to a
more-than-20-percent shareholder, thus avoiding section 337 so as to recognize the loss,
while complying with section 341(e) (4) on other sales to utilize section 337 in avoiding
recognition of gain. See Bittker, op. cit. supra note 85, at 320. Also, there is present the
argument that once the conditions of section 341(e) (4) have been met on a sale of all its
property by the corporation, and section 337 has been successfully invoked to avoid recogni-
tion of gain at the corporate level, the corporate income has been realized at the corporate
level and the corporation is no longer collapsible on the subsequent liquidation. Hence,
section 341(a) is avoided without having to meet the conditions of section 341(e)(2). See
Axelrad, supra note 64, at 396-99. Such a construction of (e) (4) and (e) (2) would render
(e) (2) a dead letter. Hence, the specific shareholder tests, contained in (e) (2) with regard
to a liquidation, but not in (e) (4) which contains only the general corporate test, would
be completely avoided on the liquidation. This construction of the provisions is rejected by
the Regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-6(e) and (d), Example (4) (1965).
103. 3B Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 22.57, at 235.
104. Sections 341(e) (2) and (e) (4) cannot be used in their intended manner without
so unwinding the corporate structure. Y Corporation cannot avail itself of section 337 on
a sale of the apiartment building because of section 337(c) (2) (A) which prevents section
337 from applying to a sale of property following the adoption of a plan of complete
liquidation to which section 332 applies where the basis of the property of the liquidating
corporation in the hands of the distributee is determined under section 334(b) (1). Since
the distributee recognizes no gain in a section 332 liquidation, gain is required to be
recognized by the subsidiary if it sells assets. Otherwise, such gain will entirely escape tax
since the proceeds of the sale pass to the distributee at a stepped-up basis. Hence, on a
sale of property by Y Corporation, although the general corporate test of section 341 (e) (4)
can be satisfied by Y Corporation so as to avoid collapsible status for the purpose of
section 337, the section 337(c)(2)(A) prohibition against the use of section 337 in the
usual section 332 liquidation is not avoided.
If section 332 does not apply to the liquidation of Y Corporation, as where X Corpora-
tion does not own 80 percent of Y stock, then section 341(e) (2) is relevant on the question
of whether the liquidating distribution to X Corporation avoids section 341(a). The
general corporate test of section 341(e)(2) has been satisfied by Y Corporation since the
apartment building is not a subsection (e) asset of that corporation. Since X Corporation
is the only shareholder receiving a distribution it would seem that no specific shareholder
test is to be made for A or B. X Corporation satisfies the specific shareholder test of
section 341(e) (2) (C)-it is not a hypothetical dealer in apartment buildings-and receives
the distribution of cash free of the application of section 341(a). However, the gain
realized by X Corporation is recognized and it will pay a capital gains tax. This recognition
of gain will take X Corporation out of the collapsible corporation category so that the
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In the holding company situation where A is a hypothetical dealer in land,
Situation IV, the application of section 341 (e) (2) and (e) (4), brings about the
same result on the liquidation of X Corporation as did sale of its stock in this
situation under section 341(e) (1). Since the apartment building would be con-
sidered a subsection (e) asset on a sale of Y stock by A due to the ordinary
income character of the building in the hands of A, A's gain from the hypo-
thetical sale of Y stock would be ordinary income and the Y stock in turn
would be a subsection (e) asset of X Corporation. Hence, X Corporation can-
not meet the general corporate test of (e) (2) and (e) (4) and these provisions
may be used by none of the shareholders to escape section 341(a), unless re-
sort is had to legislative purpose to show that only A should not escape section
341 (a). Even then, the requirements that there be a sale by X Corporation of
its assets has no meaningful application since only Y stock is owned. These
problems may be avoided by a liquidation of Y Corporation under section 332,
and a distribution of the apartment building to X Corporation, followed by a
liquidation of X Corporation. X Corporation would recognize no gain or loss
under section 332 (a) and there would be no gain upon which section 341 (a)
could operate. Section 336 would prevent any gain being recognized by Y. Then
X Corporation could utilize section 341 (e) (2) and (e) (4), or the shareholders
could utilize section 341 (e) (1), so that gain would be taxed as capital gain to
B and C, A alone being penalized for his hypothetical dealer status. By so "un-
winding" the corporate structure, as to B and C any collapsible consequences
can be avoided. 0 5
Section 341(e) (3): Relief for One-Month Liquidations
Paragraph (3) of Section 341(e) provides that a corporation shall not be
considered to be a collapsible corporation for purposes of section 333 if at all
gain of A, B and C on the liquidating distribution from X Corporation is capital gain.
Rev. Rul. 58-241, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 179. The price of section 341 avoidance here is two
capital gains -taxes. Perhaps X Corporation can avoid the corporate capital gains tax by
adopting a plan of liquidation simultaneously with Y Corporation and "selling" the Y
stock to Y Corporation in the liquidation of Y Corporation. Since Y stock is not a sub-
section (e) asset of X Corporation, the general corporate test of (e) (4) is met, as are the re-
quirements of (e) (4) that assets be sold. (Section 331 defines a liquidation as an exchange
Although section 341 (e) (4) (B) requires a sale, the last sentence of (e) (4) implies that a "sale
or exchange" can meet the requirements of (e) (4) (B).) Therefore, section 337 seems to
apply to the sale of stock of Y Corporation. On the liquidation of X Corporation, all share-
holders will receive capital gain since the general corporate test and specific shareholder tests
of section 341(e) (2) will be met. At all times after the adoption of the plan of liquidation
the Y stock held by X Corporation was not a subsection (e) asset so the general corporateo
test is met. Also, A and B pass the specific shareholder tests and all shareholders get
capital gain. The same result as above could be had if X Corporation sold its Y stock to an
outsider, complying with (e) (4) and (e) (2) in like fashion.
105. If Y Corporation is liquidated first, the same considerations obtain as are outlined
in note 104, supra, except that in a taxable liquidation of Y Corporation where X Corpora-
tion liquidates simultaneously in order to avoid the capital gains tax by complying with
section 341(e) (4) and (e) (2), or where X Corporation attempts a section 337 sale of Y
stock to an outsider, it does not appear that X Corporation can meet the general corporate
test of section 341(e)(4) and (e)(2). Because of A's hypothetical dealer status as to the
apartment building, the Y stock is a subsection (e) asset of X Corporation.
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times after the adoption of the plan of liquidation the general corporate test
is met, that is, the net unrealized appreciation in the subsection (e) assets of
the corporation does not exceed 15 percent of the net worth of the corpora-
tion.10 Like section 341(e)(4) regarding the application of section 337, and
unlike section 341(e)(1) and (2), no specific shareholder tests are imposed
under (e) (3). However, the definition of subsection (e) assets is expanded to
include assets gain from the sale of which would be ordinary income to a share-
holder who owns more than five percent in value of the outstanding stock, rather
than one who owns more than 20 percent in value of such stock.10 7 Unlike the
provisions of (e) (4), there is no requirement in (e) (3) that the corporation sell
substantially all its property. Nor is there a prohibition against the distribu-
tion of depreciable property to shareholders.
In the typical situation contemplated by section 341(e) (3), where a hold-
ing company is not present, on a distribution in complete liquidation to a
"qualified" shareholder under section 333, the shareholder's gain is recognized
and treated as a dividend to the extent of his ratable share of the earnings and
profits of the corporation. The remainder of the gain is recognized and treated
as capital gain but only to the extent that the cash and the value of the stock
and securities received by him exceeds his ratable share of earnings and profits.
The basis of the property received is the same as the basis of the shareholder
in his stock, decreased in the amount of any money received and increased in
the amount of any gain recognized.' 08 This basis is divided among the assets
received according to their fair market values.' 0 9 Thus, in Situation I, section
341(e) (3) could be utilized since the general corporate test is satisfied. Nor
would the result differ in Situation II where A is a hypothetical dealer since no
specific shareholder test must be satisfied. A distribution of the apartment build-
ing to A, B and C together with cash of 20,000 dollars representing all earnings
and profits would give A, B and C dividends of 17,000 dollars, 2000 dollars and
1000 dollars respectively; no capital gain or loss would be recognized since there
is no excess of cash or securities over the ratable share of earnings and profits.
The basis of the apartment building in the hands of the shareholders would be
the same as their respective bases in their stock and no gain is recognized with
respect to the apartment building until a subsequent sale thereof by the share-
holders.
Where a holding company is interposed between the shareholders and the
operating company, the results of a section 333 liquidation will be substantially
different. In Situation IV, where X Corporation is a holding company and A is
a hypothetical dealer in real estate, the Y stock is an ordinary income asset in the
106. Section 333(a) makes the provisions of section 333 inapplicable to a collapsible
corporation to which section 341(a) applies. Section 341(e)(3) is intended to give limited
relief from -this provision in situations where its terms are met.
107. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 341(e) (5) (B).
108. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 334(c).
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-2 (1955).
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hands of A and hence a subsection (e) asset of X Corporation. On a liquidation
of X Corporation, the general corporate test of (e)(3) could not be met and
the benefits of section 333 would be denied to the liquidation. Section 341(a)
would apply to give all shareholders ordinary income. The result here is the
same as under section 341(e) (1) and (e) (2) where all shareholders receive
ordinary income on their gain due to A being a hypothetical dealer in real estate,
even though B and C would receive capital gain: absent the holding company.
Again legislative purpose would have to be applied to give relief to B and C in
this situation.
If Y Corporation were to be liquidated first, section 333 would not apply to
the liquidation since X Corporation owns more than 50 percent of Y stock and
cannot be a "qualified shareholder" under section 333.110 Section 332, however,
would control the liquidation of Y Corporation, making it tax-free to X Corpora-
tion, and avoiding the application of section 341(a). This "unwinding" of the
corporate structure creates the typical situations contemplated by section
341(e) (3), Situations I and II, and section 333 may be utilized as discussed
above. If X Corporation owned less than 50 percent of Y stock, then it could
be a "qualified shareholder" under section 333 and Y Corporation could be
liquidated under section 333 since Y Corporation meets the general corporate
test in that its real estate is not a subsection (e) asset. X Corporation would
have a dividend of its pro rata sh~re of the 20,000 dollars earnings and profits
and would have no further gain. X Corporation would take an undivided interest
in the apartment building at the same basis as it had in Y stock. It can then in
turn engage in a section 333 liquidation and distribute its share of the apartment
building to A, B and C, together with any cash received as a dividend from Y
Corporation. Thus, A, B and C wind up in approximately the same positions as
if there had been no holding company. The only difference is the slight income
tax X pays on the dividend from Y after deducting the intercorporate dividends
received deduction of section 243.
In Situation III, where X Corporation holds Y stock and no shareholder is
a hypothetical dealer, X Corporation may be liquidated under section 333. The
Y stock will not be a subsection (e) asset of X Corporation since its sale would
give capital gain both to X Corporation and to A by reason of the application
of (e) (1) to the hypothetical sale of Y stock. On the liquidation however, the
shareholders receive only the Y stock. Since X Corporation will have no earnings
and profits, there is no amount taxed as a dividend to shareholders."1 However,
the shareholders' gain is recognized up to the value of the Y stock received so
that the entire gain realized is recognized and taxed as capital gain. Since the
shareholders will then have a basis in the Y stock equal to its value, Y Corpora-
tion can be liquidated without further gain and section 341(a), which reaches
110. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 333(b).
111. Whether the earnings and profits of Y Corporation will be attributed to X Cor-
poration is problematical. See Modrall, Collapsible Corporations and Subsection (e), 37
Taxes 895, 906 (1959).
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only gain on liquidation, will have no application. Thus, the gain from the liqui-
dations completely avoids section 341 (a) due to the combined effect of sections
341 (e) (3) and 333: section 341(e) (3) makes X Corporation non-collapsible so
as to make the provisions of section 333 applicable to any gain recognized on the
liquidation. Section 333 (e) treats the shareholder's gain, up to the value of Y
stock, as capital gain. A second effect is that the specific shareholder tests of
section 341(e) (2), normally applicable in a taxable liquidation, are bypassed.
No actual real estate dealer who is more-than-five-percent shareholder of X
Corporation may thus avoid section 341 (a) since the general corporate test of
(e) (3) would not have been met in such a case and section 333 could not be
utilized. Section 341(e) (3), however, does allow escape from the hypothetical
dealer provisions of (e) (2) under which A would have had ordinary income on
a liquidation of the apartment building from X Corporation. Lastly, the depre-
ciable apartment building is acquired by the shareholders at a stepped-up basis
with the payment of a single capital gains tax, a result generally prohibited in
the taxable liquidation situation by the provisions of section 341(e) (2) and
(e) (4).112
Like section 341(e) (2) and (e) (4), the provisions of (e) (3) operate hap-
hazardly where a holding company is part of the collapsible picture, and indeed,
present the taxpayer with greater opportunities for complete avoidance of the
legislative purpose behind section 341(e) than do the other parts of the sub-
section. Unless legislative purpose is allowed to prevail in the application of
(e) (3) to holding company situations, section 341 may be rendered completely
ineffectual.
In summary then, section 341(e) simply was not drafted to give relief in
situations where there is a collapsible holding company present. Overly compli-
cated and extremely difficult to apply even in the routine non-holding company
situation, it becomes unworkable and, indeed in most cases, irrelevant when
applied to holding company situations. It fails to give the intended relief, as
under (e) (1), (2) and (4) where a more-than-20-percent shareholder is a hypo-
thetical dealer in the property of the subsidiary. In order to use (e) (2) and
(e) (4) effectively, the corporate structure must be unwound or a double capital
gains tax must be paid. And section 341(e) (3) can be used in the holding com-
pany situation completely to frustrate the policy of both sections 341(a) and
341 (e)-to put the physical assets of the subsidiary into the hands of the
individual shareholders at capital gain rates even though one of them is a
hypothetical dealer who was intended to get ordinary income.
Section 341(e)(5): Definition of "Subsection (e)" Asset
Section 341 (e) (5) defines a subsection (e) asset generally as an asset gain
from the sale of which by the corporation or a more-than-20-percent share-
holder would be considered ordinary income and not capital gain. As we have
112. See Modral], supra note 111, at 906.
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seen, this test was intended to preclude dealers in the property of the corporation
from utilizing the relief provisions of section 341 (e). The question arising under
this definition is whether such a dealer is considered to hold the corporate prop-
erty for sale to customers, or whether he may show an investment attitude with
regard to the property so that it would not be an ordinary income asset in his
hands. Before the promulgation of the Regulations under section 341 (e), some
commentators observed that dealer status as to particular property should not
preclude a showing of investment attitude as to the property held by the cor-
poration.113 This conclusion was based upon cases in which dealers as to a
particular class of property have successfully established an investment attitude
as to a particular item of property wittin that class.114 Also, the Conference
Committee report,115 which allowed dealers'by use of section 1236(a) to show
an investment attitude toward stock and securities held by a corporation, was
considered to be evidence of Congressional intent to allow dealers in corporate
property other than stock to be considered investors in such property under
section 341 (e) (5) if the stock in the corporation was held as an investment.."0
Otherwise, it is argued, the dealer in real property is at a disadvantage with
the dealer in securities, and securities dealers operating through holding com-
panies would be preferred to real property dealers who own directly the oper-
ating company.
On analysis, this is not a persuasive argument. Where a securities dealer
incorporates a parcel of real estate, his dealer status as to stock in no way affects
his status as to real estate. The real estate should be a subsection (e) asset only
if he is a dealer in real estate. If, in this situation, a holding company is inter-
posed between the shareholder and the operating company, the question remains
the same: what is the shareholder's status as regards the real estate? In order to
reach this question, the fact that the shareholder is a dealer in securities must
somehow be ignored. Since the "look-through" approach has not been adopted in
dealing with holding companies, the Conference Committee Report and the
Regulations neutralize the presence of the stock by allowing a securities dealer
to hold it for investment under section 1236(a). Thus, a securities dealer who
would hold real estate for investment is allowed the beAefit of section 341(e)
even though he holds only the stock of a holding company which owns the stock
of a real estate operating company. If he were also a real estate dealer, he would
be disallowed the benefit of section 341 (e) because of his dealer status in real
estate, not because of his dealer status in stock. In other words, the intent of the
definition of subsection (e) assets is to preclude real estate dealers, and others
who deal in tangible property, from the use of section 341(e). It was not aimed
at securities dealers who, unlike other dealers, may protect the investment char-
113. See Boland, Collapsible Corporations Under the 1958 Amendments, 17 Tax L.
Rev. 203, 216-217 (1962) ; Goldstein, Sections 341(d) and (e)-A Journey Into Never-Never
Land, 10 Vill. L. Rev. 215, 245 (1965).
114. Boland, supra note 113, at 216, n.30.
115. See text accompanying note 93, supra.
116. Boland, supra note 113, at 217.
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acter of stock and securities in their hands through use of section 1236(a).
The Regulations make it perfectly clear that dealers in property other than
securities may not show they would have held the corporate property for in-
vestment:
If the particular shareholder holds property primarily for sale to cus-
tomers in the ordinary course of his trade or business and if similar
property is held by the corporation, then in the bands of the share-
holder such corporate property will be treated as held primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business." 7
This rule undoubtedly is harsh upon real estate dealers who may incorporate
an investment property, or who would hold the corporate property for invest-
ment. However, since an investment attitude as to stock or as to the corporate
property which is only hypothetically owned by the shareholder may be more
easily proved than if the shareholder owned the property directly, 1 8 the rule
may be regarded as desirable since it catches the great bulk of transactions
aimed at exploiting the collapsible corporation device without creating a loophole
through which the statutory purpose may be avoided. In all events, the rule does
not appear to give an advantage to securities dealers over dealers in other kinds
of property in the use of holding companies.
SECTION 341(f): RELIEF FOR THE PERMIANENT CORPORATION
Section 341 and its predecessor were intended to prevent the use of "tem-
porary corporations" to convert ordinary income into capital gain."0 However,
since the gain reached by section 341 (a) for ordinary income treatment is not
only gain from a distribution in liquidation but also from sales of stock, the
effect of section 341 has been to reach corporations which intend to stay in busi-
ness and not to liquidate. A sale of stock of a corporation which is intended as
"permanent" is within section 341 (a) if at the time of the sale the corporation
has not realized a substantial part of the income to be derived from the property.
Section 341(f), effective August 22, 1964, provides a method for differen-
tiating between "temporary" and "permanent" corporations. Section 341 (f) (1)
exempts from the operation of section 341(a) (1) sales of stock of a corporation
if the corporation has properly consented to recognize gain due to unrealized
appreciation when it disposes of any "subsection (f) asset," generally defined
as any non-capital asset but including all real property. Thus, the shareholder
is normally assured of capital gain on the sale of his stock. The price of capital
gain at the shareholder level is recognition of gain at the corporate level on any
disposition of the tainted asset. 120 Transfers in certain tax-free transactions, such
117. Treas. Reg. 1.341-6(b)(4) (1965).
118. See Boland, supra note 113, at 222.
119. See text accompanying note 10, supra; Hall, The Consenting Collapsible Corpora-
tion-Section 341(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 12 U.C.LAL. Rev. 1365, 1366
(1965).
,120. The following examples from the Senate Finance Committee Report demonstrate
how gain is taxed to the corporations:
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as section 332 liquidations and section 351 transfers, are excepted from the
subsection (f) tax if the transferee agrees to hold the transferred asset as its
own subsection (f) asset, and if the transferee is not a tax-exempt organi-
zation. 21
The price to be paid at the corporate level on any liquidating or other
distribution of its subsection (f) assets will normally prohibit the use of section
341(f) by a "temporary" corporation holding highly appreciated real estate,
inventory and other collapsible property. However, the corporation which in-
tends to remain in business indefinitely is not so seriously affected. Any subsec-
tion (f) assets consisting of inventory and depreciable personal property will be
sold or exhausted in the normal course of a continuing business. Generally, only
the real property of such a corporation will continue to be tainted. 22
If section 341(f) made no provision for holding companies, its provisions
could easily be rendered ineffective. Where the stock sold is that of a holding
company which is collapsible, a consent by the holding company to recognize
gain on the disposition of its assets would merely be a way to avoid ordinary
income at the shareholder level without paying the penalty prescribed' by section
341 (f) that gain be recognized at the corporate level. Presumably, the stock of
the subsidiary would be a capital asset in the hands of the holding company.123
If it had no other assets than the stock, then it would have no "subsection (f)"
assets and the consent to recognize gain on the disposition of non-capital assets
would be an empty formality. The shareholder will have sold his stock at capital
gains rates and the buyer, who has a basis in the stock presumably equal in
Example (1).-Corporation _X, a consenting corporation, distributes a subsec-
tion (f) asset to its shareholders in complete or partial liquidation of the corpora-
tion. The asset, at the time of the distribution, is held by the corporation primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business and has an adjusted basis of
$1,000 and a fair market value of $2,000. Under section 341(f) (2), the excess of the
fair market value of the asset over its adjusted basis is treated as gain from the sale
or exchange of property which is neither a capital asset nor property described in
section 1231. Corporation X recognizes the $1,000 gain as ordinary income even
though, in the absence of section 341(f) (2) section 336 would preclude the recog-
nition of such gain.
Example (2)-Corporation Y, a consenting corporation, distributes a subsection (f)
asset to its shareholders as a dividend. The asset, at the time of the distribution, is
property described in section 1231 and has an adjusted basis of $6,000 and a fair
market value of $8,000. Under section 341(f) (2), the excess of the fair market value
of the asset over its adjusted basis, or $2,000, is treated by corporation Y as gain
from the sale or exchange of property which is described in section 1231. Corpora-
tion Y recognizes the $2,000 gain even though, in the absence of section 341(f) (2),
section 311(a) would preclude the recognition of such gain.
Example (3) -Assume the same facts as in example (2) except that the subsection
(f) asset is section 1245 property having a "recomputed basis" (as defined in sec.
1245 (a) (2)) of $7,200. Since the recomputed basis of the asset is lower than its fair
market value, the excess of recomputed basis over adjusted basis, or $1,200, is
treated as ordinary income under section 1245 (a) (1). The remaining amount, which
is treated as gain under section 341(f) (2), or $800, is recognized under such section
as gain from the sale or exchange of property described in section 1231.
S. Rep. No. 1241, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1964), reproduced in 1964-2 Cum. Bull. 688.
121. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 341(f) (3).
122. Hall, supra note 119, at 1377-78.
123. See Hall, supra note 119, at 1378.
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value to the assets of both the holding company and the subsidiary, can liquidate
each of them in turn without further tax to anyone. On a distribution in liquida-
tion, the section 341 (f) penalty is avoided by the holding company because it
has not disposed of a tainted "subsection (f)" asset, and by the subsidiary
because it will not have consented to section 341 (f) treatment. As to both the
holding company and the subsidiary the general rule of section 336 will apply
that there is no gain or loss recognized by a corporation on the distribution of
property in complete liquidation. A like result follows if after the sale of stock,
the subsidiary is liquidated first under sections 332 or 333 (assuming the holding
company held less than 50 percent of the subsidiary stock) at no tax to the
holding company, and then the holding company is liquidated.
This result could be defeated if the stock of the subsidiary were treated
as a non-capital asset in the hands of the holding company on the theory that it
is stock in a collapsible corporation, which on sale would give rise to non-capital
gain under section 341 (a). This treatment would give the holding company sec-
tion 341 (f) gain on a subsequent distribution in liquidation. The same result
would follow if the subsidiary were liquidated under section 333, or in an up-
stream merger under section 332. The holding company will have "disposed of"
a tainted asset within the meaning of section 341(f) (2) and will recognize gain
accordingly. 124 Although the subsidiary could sell its assets to an outsider
without incurring the section 341 (f) penalty, upon liquidation of the subsidiary,
the holding company will recognize the section 341 (f) gain.
Avoiding the difficulties inherent in the above treatment, and in order
clearly to prevent escape from section 341 (a) through the use of section 341 (f)
on a sale of stock, while at the same time avoiding the section 341(f) penalty
through the use of a holding company, section 341 (f) (6) provides that if the
corporation whose stock is sold owns five percent or more in value of the out-
standing stock of another corporation on the date of the sale of the stock, the
consent of the "owning corporation" to section 341 (f) treatment is not valid
with respect to the stock sale unless the subsidiary has also filed a valid consent
with respect to sales of its stock. Moreover, section 341 (f) (6) treats a sale of
the holding company stock, which sale is protected by section 341(f) (1) from
collapsible treatment, as a sale of the stock of the subsidiary. The effect of this
is to make non-capital assets, including real estate, owned by the subsidiary as
of the date of the sale of stock of the holding company "subsection (f)" assets
under 341 (f)(4) and to subject a disposition of such assets by the subsidiary
to tax upon the unrealized appreciation under section 341 (f) (2).125 Thus, con-
124. The section 341(f)(3) exception to (f)(2) for section 332 liquidation does not
appear to apply to exempt the parent corporation from tax on the disposition of its sub-
section (f) assets, but only to exempt a consenting subsidiary from the section 341(f)
penalty in such a liquidation if the parent consents to hold the distributed property as a
subsection (f) asset. Since no such consent of the subsidiary is involved in this hypo-
thetical and it remains exempt from the tax under section 336, section 341(f)(3) has no
application whatsoever.
125. The Senate Finance Committee Report gives the foUowing example:
Thus, for example, assume corporation X owns 80 percent of the only class of stock
HOLDING COMPANY AS COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATION
secutive liquidations, first of the holding company and then of the subsidiary,
would require the subsidiary to incur the section 341(f) tax. Also, a distribution
of its property by the subsidiary to the holding company in a taxable liquida-
tion, or in a section 333 liquidation, would require it to incur the section 341 (f)
tax; a distribution in an upstream merger under section 332 would generally allow
the subsidiary to escape the section 341(f) tax, but only if the holding company
consents to have the assets which were subsection (f) assets in the hands of
the subsidiary continue as such in its hands. Thereby, a liquidation of the
holding company and the subsidiary in avoidance both of section 341 (a) at the
shareholder level and section 341(f) at the corporate level is prevented.
Subsection (f) very well prevents the use of holding companies from frus-
trating its provisions, and indeed from emasculating the whole of section 341.
As already noted, however, there should be no need for a holding company to
consent under subsection (f) merely because it meets the five percent ownership
test where the corporation is not initially collapsible because such stock holding
is not "substantial activity."'126 True, presumably such a corporation is a "per-
manent" corporation which will not be distributing its assets in complete or
partial liquidation, or as a dividend in kind. Therefore, the consent to subsection
(f) treatment would not seem seriously to affect the corporation. However, such
distributions are not the only dispositions of property which attract the subsec-
tion (f) tax. Because of the unqualified rule of sectiona341 (f) (2), which requires
recognition of gain on any disposition not excluded by section 341 (f) (3), certain
dispositions, which seem quite appropriate for "permanent corporations" and
hence are not clearly within the statutory purpose, are affected.127 Thus, the
non-recognition of gain provisions of section 1031 would not seem to apply where
there has been a "like-kind" exchange of a subsection (f) asset. Similarly, sec-
tion 1033 would not seem to apply and gain will be recognized when a subsection
(f) asset is replaced following an involuntary conversion. Also, gain would be
of corporation Y on January 1, 1966, the date on which a shareholder of corpora-
tion X sells X's stock. Assume further that corporation X filed a consent on Novem-
ber 1, 1965. In order for the consent filed by corporation X to be valid with
respect to the sale of its stock on January 1, 1966, corporation Y must have filed
during the 6-month period ending on January 1, 1966, a valid consent under sub-
section (f)(1) with respect to sales of its stock.
Paragraph (6) of the new subsection further provides that for purposes of ap-
plying paragraph (4) of the new subsection to a corporation, 5 percent or more in
value of the outstanding stock of which is owned by the owning corporation, a sale
of stock of the owning corporation to which subsection (f)(1) applies shall be
treated as a sale of stock in such other corporation. Thus, in the example in the
preceding paragraph, the subsection (f) assets of corporation Y would include prop-
erty described in subsection (f)(4) owned by, or subject to an option to acquire
held by, corporation Y on January 1, 1966. If in the above example corporation Y
had filed its consent on December 1, 1965, and a stockholder of Y had sold his stock
in Y on February 1, 1966, Y's subsection (f) assets would include not only property
owned by, or subject to an option to acquire held by, Y, on January 1, 1966, but
also any such property acquired after January 1, 1966, and not disposed of before
February 2, 1966.
S. Rep. No. 1241, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1964), reproduced in 1964-2 Cum. Bull. 690.
126. See text accompanying notes 48, 49, supra.
,127. See generally Hall, supra note 119, at 1373-75.
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recognized upon the contribution of appreciated property to a partnership or a
corporation, even though sections 721 and 351 would normally exempt such gain
from tax. And in all of these exchanges, it would seem that the gain recognized
may be ordinary income if the subsection (f) asset is section 1245 or 1250
property,128 or if section 1239 applies to the exchange, even though this is not
part of the policy behind subsection (f).
In the holding company situation, the penal effect of subsection (f) is
aggravated. Not only the holding company, but the subsidiary must consent to
subsection (f) treatment on disposition of assets, and hence two corporations
will face the above impediments to normal operation. Great caution must there-
fore be exercised in determining whether this subsection should be used in the
holding company situation.
CONCLUSION
The only part of section 341 that is designed to deal with the complex
problems raised by the collapsible holding company is subsection (f). Although
the reach of this subsection is too broad since it reaches holding companies that
are not within the legislative purpose, it does recognize and attempt to deal with
the problems raised by use of holding companies. The rest of section 341, except
for subsection (b), seems to have been drafted without regard to the holding
company problem. Literal application of its terms leads to haphazard and illogi-
cal results. Any result which is consistent with legislative purpose seems to come
about purely by accident. Like so much of section 341, the holding company
problem was given only superficial consideration. Indeed, the holding company
language of subsection (b) seems to have been added as an afterthought. Had
it received serious consideration, Congress would hardly have drafted the pre-
decessors of subsections (b) and (d) without regard to the holding company
problem. Nor would it have required that such a corporation be formed or
availed of "principally" for the holding of stock in a collapsible subsidiary. To
prevent obvious avoidance possibilities, the Regulations had to close the gap
with its "substantial activity" rule, whatever that may mean. Little considered
in the beginning, the collapsible holding company was completely disregarded in
subsequent amendments to the statute. The definition of section 341 assets in
subsection (b) (3), the presumption of section 341 (c), and the relief provisions
of subsection (e) simply have no consistent application to the collapsible holding
company. Only in 1964, with the enactment of subsection (f), was the problem
treated with somewhat the thought and attention to detail that it requires.
How then is the collapsible holding company to be treated? According to
the legislative purpose? Or will the provisions of section 341 be literally applied?
Such literal application would seem to be out of the question, and indeed out-
rageous. It would penalize the unwary taxpayer and reward the careful tax-
128. See Lnt. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1249(b) (3) and (4), 1290(d) (3) and (4).
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payer, in both situations contrary to legislative intent. Nevertheless, at least
as to the broad range of subsection (e), the Conference Committee Report, the
Regulations, and the Supreme Court in Braunstein seem to require such literal
application. Indeed, a statute such as section 341, which is drafted not in broad
general terms but with a high degree of mathematical precision, invites precise
application of its terms to situations it pretends to cover, such as those involv-
ing collapsible holding companies. Obviously, the results of such an approach
will put an unbearable strain both upon section 341 and upon taxpayers caught
in its web of complexity. One hopes that in the end it is the statute which col-
lapses so it can at last be returned for legislative overhaul.
